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THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DAVID DYZENHAUS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In common-law legal orders, public power is supposed to be exercised in ac-
cordance with the rule of law.  Administrative law, the law that governs the ex-
ercise of power by public officials, is the body of rules and principles developed 
by judges to ensure that when public officials act, they act in accordance with 
the rule of law.  Severe tensions can arise within the common-law understand-
ing of administrative law when a legislature enacts a law that meets the legal or-
der’s formal criteria for validity, yet purports to exempt officials from the re-
quirements of the rule of law.  If those officials’ decisions are challenged before 
a court, should the court declare them invalid simply on the basis that they fail 
to accord with the rule of law?  Judges who adopt positivistic theories of law 
will generally answer “no” to this question, while judges of a more natural law 
bent will tend to answer “yes.”  The former will determine a law’s validity based 
only on the criteria explicitly set out in the positive law of their order, while the 
latter will think that there is more to the question than positive law—namely, 
the transcendent moral values of the rule of law. 
Although judges of a natural-law bent will likely appreciate the tensions bet-
ter than positivistically inclined judges, a more sophisticated response to the 
problem is available than one that simply reduces it to a question of whether a 
law offensive to the rule of law is or is not a law.  That response presupposes a 
natural-law understanding of the rule of law, one which holds that the value 
content of the rule of law transcends what any formal source of law declares the 
law to be.  However, such a response does not require that a law is always inva-
lid when it fails to comply with the values of the rule of law.  Rather, all it re-
quires is that the tensions created by such a law are understood as tensions in-
ternal to legal order, tensions which must be resolved in order for that legal 
order to sustain its claim to be such—an order constituted by law.  Thus, judges 
are not necessarily always able or even often best suited to resolve such ten-
sions. 
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An exploration of this response begins with an account of how judges in 
common-law legal orders have found the norms of international law, in particu-
lar international human rights law, helpful in elaborating their understanding of 
their role in upholding the rule of law.  Indeed, international human rights law 
has helped greatly to clarify the idea of the rule of law on which the judges rely, 
both in terms of the interactions among its components and the assumptions 
that hold it together.  Judges have found international law particularly useful in 
ensuring that the rule of law is respected in an area in which traditionally posi-
tivistic judges have deemed the rule of law inapplicable—namely, in the exer-
cise of public power, which is based, not on law, but on the prerogative of the 
executive to deal with immigration and national security as it sees fit.  Natural-
law judges have been amenable to the influence of international law because 
their understanding of law and the rule of law rejects positivistic assumptions 
that lead to the marginalization of international law, even to its very claim to be 
law.  However, international legal bodies have proven capable of introducing 
the same sorts of tensions—tensions often created in the areas of national secu-
rity and immigration. 
One might say that these natural law judges, working within the common 
law tradition, have paid international law the compliment of not only recogniz-
ing its claim to be law, but also of considering it to be constitutive of their un-
derstanding of the rule of law or legality, so that public officials must comply 
with international law if they are to abide by the rule of law.  Thus, it is incum-
bent on the international bodies charged with making decisions affecting the in-
terests of individuals subject to their legal regimes to repay the compliment.  In-
ternational bodies should put in place mechanisms that will help to ensure that 
their officials comply with the package of rule-of-law controls.  As a corollary, 
domestic courts should consider decisions of international bodies suspect, 
though not necessarily invalid, to the extent that these decisions do not comply 
with such controls. 
This article will thus move from the reception of international legal norms 
(Part II.A.) to the administrative law of common-law countries (Part II.B.1.), 
and then to the reception of administrative law norms into international law 
(Part II.B.2.).1  The theme common to these topics is that the rule of law is not 
about maintaining a formal separation of powers, but about all institutions of 
legal order, whether international or domestic, serving the values articulated by 
the rule of law.2  The article will close by drawing out theoretical implications of 
 
 1. This does not imply that the common law’s conception of the rule of law has more to offer to 
the debate about international administrative law than does that of civil law systems.  The latter may 
offer more, but here my ignorance is a fact if not an excuse. 
 2. The argument here owes much to Mark D. Walters, The Common Constitution and Legal 
Cosmopolitanism, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 431 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004).  Walters wants to 
revive the original Roman idea of the ius gentium, which differed from the ius feciale, the law between 
states, since it was about a natural law or “moral common law of humanity.”  Id. at 440.  Walters argues 
that this natural law idea was lost when the Westphalian international system came into being and was 
equated with the ius gentium, in substance replacing the former with the ius feciale.  Id.  He asserts that 
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, and other cases dis-
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this theme for debates between positivists and natural-law jurists regarding the 
nature of international law. 
II 
THE RULE OF LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY MATTERS 
A. The Common-Law Courts and the Rule of Law 
Common-law judges presume that individuals whose interests are affected 
by the decisions of administrative public officials have certain rights.  The pack-
age of rights involved depends on many factors, including the way in which doc-
trine has developed in the particular legal order, the nature of the interest af-
fected, the impact of the decision on the interest, and, assuming the official is 
acting on the basis of authority delegated by statute, on what the statute actu-
ally prescribes.  In the abstract, the package at its fullest may include the right 
to a hearing before a decision is made, the right to have the decision made in an 
unbiased and impartial fashion, the right to know the basis of the decision so 
that it can be contested. the right to reasons for the official’s decision, and the 
right to a decision that is reasonably justified by all relevant legal and factual 
considerations.  Except for the last, all these rights are usually grouped into the 
category of “procedural rights,” which pertain to the way in which a decision is 
made.  By contrast, the last-mentioned gives the individual the right to a sub-
stantively sound decision.  To make these rights effective, one more right must 
be added to the package—the right to have the validity of the decision tested in 
a court of law. 
When common-law judges uphold official decisions, they are also certifying 
that the officials acted in accordance with the rule of law.  Official compliance 
with the package of rights thus marks the difference between a rule-of-law soci-
ety and one in which individuals are subject to the arbitrary rule of men. 
In the common law of judicial review, something roughly like the package of 
rights just described is thought to supply the content of the rule-of-law regime 
with which judges presume all officials must comply.  The qualification “some-
thing roughly like” is necessary to indicate that the content of the package is 
controversial and that the rule of law is an essentially contested concept.3  How-
ever, the terms of that contest can be unpacked in order to illuminate the sub-
ject of the rule of (administrative) law in international law.  The claim here is 
that the package fulfills the central aspiration of the rule of law—the subjection 
 
cussed infra, demonstrate that the common law constitution can be understood as embodying Kant’s 
idea of a ius cosmopoliticum, itself an attempt to revive the original ius gentium.  Moreover, he believes 
that revival can meet the challenge of what would otherwise appear to be black holes in legal order.  Id. 
 3. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & 
PHIL. 137 (2002). 
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of public power to controls that ensure it is exercised in the interests of those af-
fected by it.   
Further, in order to have that package, one has to adopt a non-positivist un-
derstanding of law and legal order or legality, which, for now, can be described 
as embracing just three points:  First, while the prescriptions of the statute un-
der whose authority an official is acting are most relevant to determining the 
content of the package, the content is not contingent on the statute’s prescrip-
tions.  As a well-known judgment put it, “the justice of the common law will 
supply the omission of the legislature.”4  Put differently, the basis of the rule of 
law is not in the positive law provided by the legislature, but in what can be 
thought of as the unwritten or common-law constitution.  Second, the common-
law constitution applies even when the official’s claimed authority is not derived 
from statute but from the prerogative powers of government—the residuary 
power of the sovereign, which, as Dicey claimed, is the “residue of discretionary 
or arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the 
Crown.”5  These two points suggest—against the grain of positivist tradition—
that the operation of the values of the rule of law does not depend on their 
prior expression in positive enactments of the legislature.  In addition, a third 
point undermines a more sophisticated kind of legal positivism, one that seeks 
to recognize judgments as a source of positive law:  that judges have developed 
a common law of judicial review over time is considered the positive law basis 
for their understanding of the rule of law.  The idea is that proponents of the 
common-law constitution consider judgments to be evidence of the require-
ments of the rule of law and not the source of those requirements. 
The most controversial part of the package is its substantive component, the 
right to a decision that is reasonably justified by all relevant legal and factual 
considerations.  When judges review on the basis of procedural components, 
they can claim that because procedure pertains to how a decision is made, not 
which decision was made, they are not second-guessing the legislature’s decision 
to delegate authority over substance to the officials charged with implementing 
the statute.  This distinction between process and substance is hard to sustain, 
not only because procedural rights might protect the same values as substantive 
rights, but also because the connection between procedural and substantive 
components is very tight.  Procedural and substantive rights have what one can 
think of as a symbiotic relationship.  For the moment, however, the focus will be 
not on the fragility of this distinction, but on the reasons for making it—a judi-
cial concern about the legitimacy of the common law of judicial review. 
This concern stems from a formal doctrine about the separation of powers, 
which holds that Parliament has a monopoly on making law—on the production 
of legal norms.  The rest of the powers necessary to sustain the rule of law are 
divided between the executive, with its monopoly on implementing the law, and 
 
 4. Cooper v. Bd. of Works for the Wandsworth Dist., 21 Eng. Rep. 414, 420  (C.B.), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 
180, 194 (1863) (Byles, J.). 
 5. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 424 (1987). 
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the judiciary, with its monopoly on interpreting the law.  When the executive 
acts, it must act within the limits of its legal authority, that is, within the author-
ity provided by the particular enabling statute.  Judges fulfill their role by polic-
ing those limits.  This doctrine of judicial review, the doctrine of ultra vires, thus 
holds that the limits on executive discretion in implementing a statutory man-
date are only the limits prescribed by statute or by some other supra-
authoritative source, for example, a statute prescribing general rules for all ad-
ministrative bodies or a written constitution. 
In democratic theory, Parliament’s alleged monopoly on legislative power is 
rooted in the claim that only the people’s representatives have the authority to 
make law.  But justification for the formal doctrine of the separation of powers 
need not be rooted in democratic theory.  It can, for example, reside in a Hob-
besian argument about the need to concentrate legislative power in one body.  
However, for present purposes, it will be assumed that the judicial concern 
about the legitimacy of intruding upon executive decisionmaking is a democ-
ratic one. 
Now, the history of the common law of judicial review is a history of judges 
imposing controls on public officials that are not prescribed by any statute.  Not 
all judges have been comfortable with this history, and so there has been, and 
continues to be, significant judicial resistance to imposing controls beyond those 
explicitly contemplated by statute or written constitution.  To the extent there 
has been comfort among such judges, it has rested on the distinction between 
process and substance:  if judges stick to the process side of the distinction, they 
are not intruding into substance.  It is also often claimed that there is a kind of 
tacit legislative consent to judicial imposition of procedural controls discernable 
from the legislature’s ability, if it chose, either to preemptively exclude such 
controls or to override them in the wake of a judgment.  However, the doctrine 
of tacit consent cannot be invoked with respect to judicial intrusion into sub-
stance, since the very legislative delegation of authority to the executive is taken 
as an altogether explicit signal to the judiciary of legislative intent. 
The formal doctrine of the separation of powers, the doctrine that leads to 
this judicial discomfort with review, is unhelpful.  On its best understanding, the 
separation of powers is not so much about formal divisions between the compe-
tences of the legislative, the judicial, and the executive.  Rather, it concerns 
their roles in ensuring that public power is exercised in accordance with the sub-
stantive and procedural values of the rule of law. 
B. The Rule of Law: Challenges and Opportunities 
1. Domestic Administrative Decisions 
The idea of unfettered discretion, that officials are a “law unto themselves” 
within the limits clearly stated in the statute, has important affinities with the 
idea of the prerogative as a legally uncontrolled space.  There seems to be a 
family of such ideas in the theory and practice of law in common-law legal or-
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ders—ideas that are connected to the Hobbesian idea that the international 
domain is a lawless state of nature.  Foreign affairs or participation by states in 
that domain is considered to be a matter of uncontrolled prerogative, since 
states within that domain are seen as analogous to individuals within the state of 
nature.  Similarly, the thought of national security as a matter for the preroga-
tive is connected to the idea that those who threaten the very existence of the 
state have put themselves into a state of nature with regard to that sovereign.  
Control over immigration or aliens is thus control over those who wish to enter 
a civil society from either a state of nature or from another civil society whose 
relationship with the first is itself in a state of nature.  While both immigration 
and national security are now generally controlled by statute, their history as 
prerogative powers often looms large in a judge’s approach to statutory inter-
pretation, especially when officials are given broad discretionary powers to 
make security or immigration determinations. 
Given this concern about judicial intrusion into substance, it is hardly sur-
prising that many common-law judges have adopted the stance known as “dual-
ism” with respect to the norms of international law other than those of custom-
ary international law, which are supposed to have domestic force whether or 
not the legislature has explicitly incorporated them.  Dualists hold that the only 
legitimate source of legal norms within their legal orders is the legislature.  
They thus argue that with the exception of customary international law, interna-
tional legal norms may have force domestically only when the legislature has 
explicitly incorporated them by statute.  It follows that executive ratification of 
a treaty is a signal to the outside world, but not to the subjects of the domestic 
legal order.  To enforce such norms would be to permit the executive to usurp 
legislative power, though the instrument of usurpation would not be the execu-
tive itself, but judges, who would in substance have incorporated the norms 
through the back door.6 
The tale that follows illustrates how common-law judges responsible for 
bringing international norms into the embrace of the common law of their four 
jurisdictions—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom— 
understood what they were doing, not as incorporating through the back door, 
but as updating the values of the rule of law, or “working the law pure.”7  The 
tale is remarkable in its display of what one could call an international dialogue 
between judges about the role of international norms in domestic law, particu-
larly in informing their understanding of the controls exercised on public offi-
cials by the rule of law. 
 
 6. Dualists do permit one port of entry into domestic law for these non-customary norms of inter-
national law, via the maxim that judges should deal with statutory ambiguity by resolving it in favor of 
international law.  However, since grants of discretion to officials were long viewed as unambiguous 
delegations of authority to the officials—an unfettered discretion to decide as they thought best—there 
did not usually seem to dualists  to be any ambiguity to resolve. 
 7. For a full account of all except the last case discussed in this section, see David Dyzenhaus et 
al., The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 5 (2001). 
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In the first three countries, the norm that sparked the process was Article 3 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),8 which all 
three had ratified but not incorporated.  Article 3 provides that, “in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare in-
stitutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”  In all three cases, the 
issue was whether an immigration official’s decision to deport a parent with 
children in the host country had to take into account the interests of the chil-
dren as a “primary consideration.”  The legal vehicles for Article 3 were the 
statutory regimes of the three countries, which required, in various ways, that 
decisions about whether to deport an individual had to be taken in the light of 
“humanitarian” or “compassionate” considerations. 
The first decision by New Zealand’s Court of Appeal, Tavita v. Minister of 
Immigration,9 did not formally decide anything because the case was adjourned 
so that the Minister could reconsider.  However, in rejecting the argument put 
forth by the Crown, which conceded that the Minister had not considered the 
CRC but contended that the CRC was of no effect in the domestic legal system, 
the Court stated an important principle, describing this argument as “unattrac-
tive, apparently implying that New Zealand’s adherence to the international in-
struments has been at least partly window-dressing.”10  In the Court’s view, 
when an official is making this kind of decision, “the basic rights of the family 
and the child are the starting point.”11 
This idea of a presumption against hypocrisy was then relied on by the ma-
jority of the High Court of Australia in Minister of State for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh,12 which reasoned that the CRC created a legitimate ex-
pectation in Teoh and his children that any decision relating to residency or de-
portation would be made in accordance with the principle in Article 3(1), 
namely, that the best interests of the children would be a primary considera-
tion.13  This expectation could be validly defeated only by informing the Teohs 
that the Convention principle would not be applied and by giving them the op-
portunity to persuade the decisionmaker to change her mind.14 
Finally, in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),15 
Canada’s Supreme Court held that although a decision about whether to stay a 
deportation order on “humanitarian and compassionate grounds” was one the 
legislature had delegated to the expert discretion of immigration officials, the 
decision still had to be reasonable, that is, justified by relevant legal considera-
 
 8. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 9. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.). 
 10. Id. at 266. 
 11. Id. at 265. 
 12. (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273. 
 13. Id. at 291. 
 14. Id. at 291-92. 
 15. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
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tions.16  In other words, discretion was no longer viewed as a legal void or state 
of nature, but as replete with legal values.  The Court held that among the legal 
factors informing its understanding of the content of reasonableness was Article 
3 of the CRC.17  Since the officials had not given sufficient weight to the inter-
ests of Baker’s children, their decision was thus invalid because it was unrea-
sonable.18  En route to this holding, the Court also articulated a general duty at 
common law to give reasons for decisions that affect important interests—the 
first time the highest court in any one of these four jurisdictions discussed in this 
section had claimed that such a duty exists.19 
The duty to give reasons, articulated in the procedural part of the judgment, 
not only seems premised on the idea of the inherent dignity of the individual, 
but was considered necessary, in large part, to make possible the kind of rea-
sonableness review described in the substantive part of the judgment.20  More-
over, while the content given to reasonableness—the idea that the children’s in-
terests had to be given special weight—was drawn from sources besides Article 
3, namely, the immigration statute and the Immigration Department’s own 
regulations and guidelines, it seems clear that Article 3 was the main—and per-
haps the only—source of inspiration for the idea.21 
This is only fitting.  Expressed in various ways in the immigration regimes of 
these countries, the idea that deportable non-citizens are not subject to the 
completely unfettered discretion of the immigration department, but must be 
treated in a way that is attentive to humanitarian considerations, is itself a post-
war innovation inspired by the international law discourse on human rights.22  
 
 16. Id. at 857-58. 
 17. Id. at 861. 
 18. Id. at 863.  The Court also invalidated the decision on the ground of bias and recognized that 
the case could have been decided on that basis alone. 
 19. Id. at 848-49. 
 20. See David Mullan, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)—A Defining 
Moment in Canadian Administrative Law, 7 REID’S ADMIN. L. 145, 151 (1999). 
 21. As in other cases on the CRC discussed in the text, the line of argument put forward by lawyers 
shifted after they had started the process of litigation before the courts, once they had become apprised 
of the possible impact of the CRC. 
 22. The decision of the majority of the House of Lords in A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Depart-
ment is instructive here. [2004] U.K.H.L. 56 (appeal taken from Eng.).  At issue was Chapter 23, Sec-
tion 1 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, a post-September 11 statute, which permit-
ted the indefinite detention of suspected international terrorists who could not be deported because 
they faced the risk of torture in their home countries.  The majority of the House of Lords quashed the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, which alleged that the United Kingdom 
was entitled, because of the emergency which followed September 11, to derogate from Article 5(1)(f) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which permits deprivation of liberty only in certain ex-
ceptional cases, including deprivation of liberty of a person “against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation.”  Id. at para. 72.  The Court also issued a declaration of incompatibility with Arti-
cle 5 and with Article 14, which precludes discrimination on the grounds of national origin.  Id. at para. 
158.  While the majority conceded that the question whether there was an emergency was for the ex-
ecutive and Parliament to decide, the judges were not prepared to hold that a measure that targeted 
aliens was a proportionate and non-discriminatory response to the emergency, especially given that the 
government conceded that there were suspected national terrorists at large in the United Kingdom.  Id. 
at para. 72.  The majority drew extensive support from international human rights law for its argument 
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This discourse has advanced the idea that officials should be attentive to policy 
and political considerations, but must also take into account the humanity of the 
individuals subject to the decision and the impact of the decision on them.  In 
other words, the idea of the individual as a bearer of human rights reinforces 
the notion that any individual subject to official power must be treated in a way 
respectful of his or her status as a member of humanity.  Thus, it should be no 
great surprise if the developing international human rights discourse is then 
used to fill out the content of humanitarianism. 
Together, these cases evoke two important themes of the jurisprudence on 
international human rights norms.  First, a public commitment to membership 
in the international human rights community must, on pain of conviction of hy-
pocrisy, be given domestic legal force.23  Second, when international human 
rights are in issue, they must be given special weight when it comes to balancing 
their demands against the demands of other considerations such as public pol-
icy.  Human rights cannot be thought about only to be dismissed.  There is a 
kind of logic to taking human rights seriously, which requires them to be given 
special weight in the deliberations of public officials.24 
In contrast, the stance of judges who dissent in these sorts of cases is often 
driven by the old idea that control of immigration is a matter of executive pre-
rogative and thus immune to the rule of law.25  The prerogative is preserved in 
 
that it was impermissible to draw a distinction between nationals and aliens when at issue was the lib-
erty interest involved in indefinite detention derogation orders.  Id. at paras. 44-72. 
 23. Nevertheless, the Court in Baker, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, avoided relying explicitly on this theme.   
 24. Since Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada is now rather preoc-
cupied with the idea that whatever judges do, they should not “reweigh” the factors officials have to 
take into account in order to demonstrate that their decisions are reasonable.  Weight is, however, just 
a metaphor for a proper inquiry into the balance of reasons.  It became part of the Canadian discussion 
because the majority in Baker was clearly influenced by Canada’s having ratified, though not incorpo-
rating by legislation, the CRC.  Id. at 860-61.  Since Baker, the Supreme Court has retreated from its 
position expressed therein, and has adopted the view, more like that of the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Baker, that judges must never evaluate the way that legally relevant factors figure in the official’s rea-
soning.  Baker v. Canada, [1997] 142 D.L.R. 554, 563 (Fed C.A.).  They can verify that the right reasons 
were taken into account but may not balance, or reweigh, the reasons.  It is hardly an accident that this 
apparent retreat from Baker took place in Suresh,  the first major decision in the national security area 
given by the Supreme Court after September 11, 2001.  For comment, see David Mullan, Deference 
from Baker to Suresh and Beyond—Interpreting the Conflicting Signals, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 
21 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004). 
 25. Thus, in New Zealand, in a subsequent Court of Appeal decision, Justice Keith suggested, 
against the claim in Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.), that the children’s 
interests should be the “starting point” of the analysis, that special weight should not be given to the 
children’s interests in these sorts of cases since the starting point in an official’s reasoning “must be the 
position of the person who is unlawfully in the country or who is being deprived of residency rights.”  
Puli’uvea v. Removal Review Auth., [1996] N.Z.L.R. 538, 540 (C.A.).  The analysis in Rajan v. Minister 
of Immigration, [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 543 (C.A.), is similarly unenthusiastic about the approach suggested 
in Tavita.  In Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, Jus-
tice McHugh forcefully dissented on separation of powers grounds, while in Baker, two judges entered 
a partial dissent, also on separation of powers grounds, to permitting the Convention any role in the 
determination of weight.  The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Baker adopted Justice McHugh’s 
dissent in Teoh.  When the Supreme Court decided Baker, both the majority and the partial dissent 
avoided any mention of Teoh, perhaps  because dealing with Teoh would have required the judges to 
confront very directly the distinction between process and substance.  For similar reasons, the majority 
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that, even when the immigration statute prescribes that officials must take hu-
manitarian considerations into account, the judge deems the manner in which 
that is achieved to be within the discretion of the official. 
However, even when no statute is involved and the exercise of executive au-
thority is based entirely on the prerogative, common-law courts are evidently 
willing, on occasion, to extend the reach of the rule of law, as is illustrated by 
Abbasi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.26  In Abassi, the English 
Court of Appeal had to deal with the detention of the plaintiff in what it de-
scribed as a “legal black hole.”27  Abbasi was one of a number of British citizens 
captured by American forces in Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo 
Bay, an area controlled by the United States and thus beyond the jurisdiction of 
English courts.  Challenges in the U.S. courts had at that stage led nowhere; 
these courts had held that the “legality” of the detention of foreign nationals 
rests “solely on the dictate of the United States Government, and, unlike that of 
United States’ citizens, is said to be immune from review in any court or inde-
pendent forum.”28 
Abbasi’s lawyers sought a finding from the English Court of Appeal that the 
Foreign Secretary owed him a duty to respond positively to his request for dip-
lomatic assistance.  Two obstacles seemed to stand in Abbasi’s way.  First, the 
principle of comity requires that an English court will not examine the legiti-
macy of action taken by a foreign sovereign state.  Second, an English court will 
not adjudicate upon actions taken by the executive in the exercise of its pre-
rogative to conduct foreign relations. 
In response to the first obstacle, the Court of Appeal relied on previous au-
thority in accepting Abbasi’s contention that “where fundamental human rights 
are in play, the courts of this country will not abstain from reviewing the legiti-
macy of the actions of a foreign sovereign state.”29  The Court then went on to 
accept the argument that Abbasi’s detention contravened “fundamental princi-
ples recognised by both jurisdictions and by international law.”30  It referred to  
 
avoided using the exact language of the CRC to describe the process whereby an official had to take 
into account the children’s interests. 
 26. [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1598. 
 27. Id. at para. 64. 
 28. Id. at para. 66. 
 29. Id. at para. 53.  One of the authorities relied upon was the famous decision of the House of 
Lords in Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, [1976] A.C. 249 (appeal taken from Eng.), a decision in which the 
Court had to decide whether a decree passed in Germany in 1941, which deprived Jews who had emi-
grated from Germany of their citizenship, should be recognized by the English court.  Abbasi, at para. 
52.  Lord Phillips quoted at length the passage from Lord Cross’s judgment, which ends with this line: 
“To my mind a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of 
this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.”  Id. at para. 52 (quoting Oppenheimer, at 
278). 
 30. Id. at para. 64. 
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common law, to U.S. constitutional law,31 and to the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).32 
In responding to the argument about the non-justiciability of the foreign af-
fairs prerogative, the Court rejected arguments that either the European Con-
vention on Human Rights or the Human Rights Act (1998) provided that the 
Foreign Secretary owed Abbasi a duty to exercise diplomacy on his behalf.33  
The Court did not conclude, however, that decisions by the executive are non-
justiciable when they pertain to its dealings with foreign states regarding the 
protection of British nationals abroad.34  Rather, the Court drew on Council of 
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service35 for two propositions.  First, 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation “provides a well-established and flexible 
means for giving legal effect to a settled policy or practice for the exercise of an 
administrative discretion.”36  The expectation, which may arise from an express 
promise or the existence of a regular practice, is not necessarily that the promise 
will be fulfilled or that the practice will continue, but that the subject is entitled 
to have the promise or practice properly considered before any change is 
made.37  Second, the mere fact that a power derives from the royal prerogative 
does not “necessarily exclude it from the scope of judicial review.”  Rather, the 
issue of justiciability “depends, not on general principle, but on subject matter 
and suitability in the particular case.”38  Here the Court, following Teoh, re-
ferred to a prior decision that accepted that ratification by the United Kingdom 
of an international convention could, in principle, create a legitimate expecta-
tion.39 
The Court then noted that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had a 
policy of assisting British citizens abroad when there is evidence of a miscar-
riage or denial of justice.40  Since Abassi’s case involved the denial of a funda-
mental right, it followed he had a legitimate expectation that the government 
 
 31. Specifically, the Court referred to Lord Atkin’s dissent in Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 
206 (appeal taken from Eng.), id. at para. 60, and to a dictum of Justice Brennan for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1963, in which Brennan adopted the claim of an English judge that habeas corpus was “a writ 
antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.”  Id. at para. 61, 
citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963), adopting Lord Birkenhead, in Sec’y of State v. O’ Brien, 
[1923] A.C. 603, 609 (appeal taken from Ir.). 
 32. Abbasi, at para. 63.  In Article 4, the ICCPR provides the right of a detainee to have access to a 
court to decide on the lawfulness of his detention and, in Article 2, requires that the parties, which in-
clude the United States and the United Kingdom, ensure that the rights protected by the Covenant are 
accorded to all individuals “without distinction of any kind, such as . . . national origin.”  Id. at para. 63. 
 33. Id. at paras. 70-79. 
 34. Id. at para. 80. 
 35. [1985] A.C. 374 (1984). 
 36. Abbasi, at para. 82. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at paras. 83-85. 
 39. Id. at at para. 86, citing R v. Home Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. (Ex p. Ahmed and Patel), 
[1998] I.N.L.R. 570, at 584. 
 40. Id. at paras. 88-92. 
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would “consider” making representations.41 However, the Court stressed the 
limited nature of the expectation, in that the individual’s request will be prop-
erly considered, that is, weighed against all the other non-justiciable and highly 
sensitive political factors.42  The “extreme case,” one in which judges should 
make a mandatory order that the Foreign Office give due consideration to the 
Applicant’s case, would lie if the Office were, “contrary to its stated practice, to 
refuse even to consider whether to make diplomatic representations on behalf 
of a subject whose fundamental rights were being violated.”43  Finally, the Court 
expressed its confidence that U.S. Appellate Courts would prove to have the 
“same respect for human rights as our own,” and noted that the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights had “taken up the case of the detainees,” though 
it was “yet unclear what the result of the Commission’s intervention will be.”44 
The Court thus informed the executive it would be concerned if the execu-
tive departed from its practice and also sent a disapproving message to the U.S. 
government and its courts.  This message has been strongly reinforced by a 
member of the House of Lords, Lord Steyn, who in two speeches has suggested 
to both the U.S. Supreme Court and his own that they put their rule-of-law 
house in order.45  There is, however, more to the judgment than that. 
The Court left open the possibility of more intrusive review in other circum-
stances.46  For example, if there were no outstanding court actions in regard to 
Abbasi, it might be thought appropriate for Abbasi to have a legitimate expec-
tation that went beyond a mere “consideration” of his case.  However, the sig-
nificance of the decision lies in its “clear signal that where fundamental human 
rights are at stake, the courts will be reluctant to allow the government to hide 
too far behind the prerogative power”47 or to allow foreign governments to hide 
behind the doctrine of comity.  It is this issue that explains the Court’s  refer-
ence to the role of international human rights conventions in legitimately influ-
encing a court’s understanding of the legitimate expectations of individuals.  
This reference is the only loose end in an otherwise very tight set of reasons, 
unless one takes it as a general placeholder for the Court’s acceptance of 
Abbasi’s argument that the “increased regard paid to human rights in both in-
ternational and domestic law”48 meant international law could no longer be re-
garded as a matter of relations between states, but as giving “rise to individual 
rights.”49  Although these rights might not manifest themselves as enforceable 
 
 41. Abbasi, at para. 99.  A British citizen had a legitimate expectation that if he is “subjected 
abroad to a violation of a fundamental right, the British government will not simply wash their hands of 
the matter and abandon him to his fate.”  Id. at para. 98. 
 42. Id. at para. 99. 
 43. Id. at para. 104. 
 44. Id. at para. 107. 
 45. See Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1 (2004). 
 46. Charlotte Kilroy, R. (on the Application of Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs; Reviewing the Prerogative, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. R. 222, 229 (2003). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Abbasi, at para. 25. 
 49. Id. at para. 39. 
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duties in the domestic legal order, they still can play a role in controlling public 
authorities.  Moreover, the role they play is not incorporating international le-
gal norms through back door or front door, but rather, as the judges see it, 
through enriching the judges’ sense of the content of the common-law constitu-
tion. 
A fruitful way of capturing the difference between these cases and those 
that formally account for the separation of powers is to see the former as a judi-
cial updating of the common law’s stock of values to include human rights—
rights whose articulation and importance is not exclusively or even mainly in 
domestic legal instruments.  In this newer, broader view, judges no longer con-
sider their role to be as guardians of values that sustain the relationship be-
tween citizen and state, but to be also, even primarily, guardians of the values 
that sustain the relationship between individual and state, in which the individ-
ual is understood as the bearer of human rights.  The change is the product of 
the human rights era, itself the product of the wave of treaties and conventions 
that responded to the abuses of the Second World War, as well as to the de-
colonization process that followed that war. 
While this change should not be underestimated—it is a consequential 
reconceptualization of the judicial role—nor in one important sense should it be 
overestimated.  The common law of judicial review always depended for its le-
gitimacy on the notion of an unwritten constitution of legality.  Judgments are 
but the evidence of this constitution, as are other legal texts, and its content 
evolves as we come better to understand what legality requires.  Thus, the 
change is not in the methodology of the common law’s self-understanding, but 
only in the content of that understanding.  Moreover, the change in content 
brings to the fore an aspect of common-law constitutionalism, an aspect that 
highlights the productive tension between the claim that the values of the com-
mon law have existed from time immemorial and the claim that our understand-
ing of those values evolves. 
If one takes the dualism of the partial dissent in Baker50 seriously, one must 
also take seriously the political objection that supports dualism—that Parlia-
ment has a monopoly on creating legal value within the domestic legal order.  
However, this objection applies with equal force to the majority’s recognition 
that the reviewing court has a common-law duty to give reasons.  It applies as 
well to extending reasonableness review to discretionary decisions, which in the 
past would have been considered reviewable at most on a much less strict stan-
dard,  such as patent or manifest unreasonableness.51  The objection applies with 
equal force unless one adopts the rather strained device of attempting to legiti-
mate what judges do by reference to the tacit or implied consent of the legisla-
ture—the ultra vires doctrine.  This device, however, cannot be stretched to in-
 
 50. Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at 865-66. 
 51. This is the Canadian standard, which is equivalent in the United Kingdom to Wednesbury un-
reasonableness, see Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury, [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (1947), and in 
the U.S. to an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. 
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clude unincorporated, though ratified, human rights conventions because legis-
lative failure to incorporate cannot be interpreted as tacit consent. 
That the device cannot be stretched this far might be thought, as did the dis-
senters in Teoh and Baker, to indicate simply that judges have reached the lim-
its of their review authority.  The better understanding is, however, that one 
contribution of the judicial domestication of international human rights law is 
that it underlines the poverty of the ultra vires doctrine as a justification for ju-
dicial review.  This judicial domestication shows that the true justification was 
never a view of legislative consent derived from the separation of powers.  
Rather, it was the constitution of legality, a constitution to whose values the leg-
islature is just as accountable as the executive.  Put differently, overcoming du-
alism about international norms may help us to finally move away from the kind 
of internal dualism sustained by legal positivist accounts of the judicial role in 
upholding the rule of law. 
2. International Administrative Decisions 
This section develops an international law case study of the listing mecha-
nism developed by the Security Council of the United Nations in the wake of 
September 11.52  It concerns one specific act of legislation or lawmaking by the 
Security Council that has potentially profound consequences for the human 
rights of individuals.53  Under Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, the Security Council may make a determination that there exists a 
“threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and it may then 
either make “recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”  Here, it relies on the au-
thority provided by Articles 40, 41, and 42.  Article 41 of the United Nations 
Charter authorizes the Security Council to decide “what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions” and to 
“call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.” 
Prior to 2001, the practice of the Security Council had generally been to ex-
ercise these powers regarding specific conflicts and situations, for example, by 
imposing sanctions on a state in order to bring it into compliance with interna-
 
 52. The argument relies very heavily on an excellent paper by E. Alexandra Dosman, For the Re-
cord: Designating “Listed Entities” for the Purposes of Terrorist Financing Offenses at Canadian Law, 
62 U. TORONTO FAC. OF L. R. 1 (Winter 2004), as well as on the factum (brief) prepared by the lawyers 
for Liban Hussein: Michael D. Edelson and David M. Paciocco, Edelson and Associates, Ottawa, On-
tario (on file with the author).  The author thanks David Paciocco for answering some queries about 
the episode. 
 53. One might object to this study on two grounds.  First, it is about only one case, so little can be 
learned from it.  However, this kind of lawmaking by international bodies is quite widespread (for ex-
ample, edicts by the World Health Organization about whether a city or country is SARS-affected) and 
is one of the factors that prompted inquiry into the prospects for a global administrative law.  Second, 
one might object that international law purports to relate primarily to the interests of states and states’ 
interests were adequately protected in the case discussed here.  My argument presupposes the position 
that international law, especially given the development of international human rights law, can no 
longer be seen as being exclusively about states’ interests.  It is also about the protection of individuals’ 
human rights from arbitrary power, whatever the source of that power. 
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tional law.  The Council would enjoin all states to comply with its decision, but 
the particular and temporary nature of the decisions did not appear legislative 
and thus did not offend the thought that intergovernmental organizations can-
not legislate international law.54  To the extent that the Council departed from 
this particularism and addressed conflicts in general, it would refrain from ad-
dressing states in compulsory terms and “call upon” them or “urge” them to 
take measures.55 
After September 11, prompted by the United States, the Council adopted 
Resolution 1373, which posited “all States shall” take certain actions against the 
financing of terrorist activities, among other actions.56  The resolution also es-
tablished a plenary committee of the Council, the “Counter-Terrorism Commit-
tee,” to monitor implementation of the resolution.  Since this Resolution is lim-
ited neither by time nor to a particular conflict, but focuses rather on an 
undefined threat of “global terrorism,” in significant measure it can be “said to 
establish new binding rules of international law—rather than mere commands 
relating to a particular situation—and, moreover, even [to] create[] a mecha-
nism for monitoring compliance with them.”57 
In addition, the Afghanistan Committee58 had its mandate expanded to in-
clude monitoring economic sanctions imposed by Resolution 1390 of 2002, 
which clarifies state obligations regarding listed entities.59  The committee sub-
sequently became known as the 1267 Committee and was responsible for com-
piling a list of individuals and entities pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Resolution 
1390.60  In practice, the 1267 Committee’s list is based more or less on informa-
tion supplied by countries, most notably the United States. 
The listing mechanism can have far-reaching domestic consequences.61  Can-
ada, by tradition a dualist country, requires the legislature to transform interna-
tional treaty rules by legislation before the norms will be given domestic effect.  
Section 2 of Canada’s United Nations Act of 1945 authorizes the Governor in 
Council (or Cabinet), once the Security Council has called on Canada under 
 
 54. Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 902. 
 56. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 
 57. Szasz, supra note 54, at 902. 
 58. The Afghanistan Committee was created previously by Resolution 1267 of the Security Council 
in order to deal with Afghanistan, S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1267 (1999). 
 59. S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002). 
 60. An individual or organization that has been listed cannot apply to be delisted.  A listed person 
must petition his or her home country to request a review of the case, and the home country then acts 
as the person’s advocate if the review is favorable.  The home country has to approach the government 
requesting the listing and attempt to persuade it to submit a joint or separate request to the Security 
Council for delisting.  The home country can then submit the request even if the other government 
does not agree, but every member of the committee has an effective veto on any request.  If the com-
mittee cannot achieve consensus, then the matter is remitted to the Security Council for final decision-
making.  See Dosman, supra note 52, at 13 (discussing the Guidelines established for the 1267 Commit-
tee.) 
 61. For an illuminating study of the listing mechanism, see Dosman, supra note 52. 
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Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, to apply one of its measures to “make 
such orders and Regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for 
enabling the measure to be effectively applied.”  These executive measures 
have to be laid before Parliament, which may resolve them within forty working 
days; otherwise the order or regulation ceases to have effect. 
Four days after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, the Gover-
nor in Council issued the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regula-
tions.  These Regulations aim to cut off funding of terrorists by prohibiting fi-
nancial dealings with a list of entities and by making it an offense to provide or 
collect funds for a listed person.62  Further, they impose a duty on Canadian fi-
nancial institutions, residents of Canada, and all other Canadians to disclose any 
property they have reason to believe is owned by or controlled by or on behalf 
of a listed person, as well as information related to transactions involving such 
property. 
On November 7, 2001, the U.S. sought the extradition of Liban M. Hussein, 
a Canadian citizen and resident of Ottawa, for allegedly engaging in an illegal 
money transmittal business, an offense under U.S. law.63  Although Canadian 
law requires that extradition be on the basis of an offense that has a parallel in 
Canadian law, no such offense existed.  In any case, U.S. authorities clearly 
wanted Hussein for questioning in connection with the “war” on terror, as they 
had been alerted by a private company with which they had contracted to en-
gage in counter-terrorism that Hussein was transmitting money to Arab coun-
tries.  However, even though the U.S. Customs Service had engaged in an ex-
tensive investigation of Hussein’s activities, no terrorism or money-laundering 
charges had been brought against him.  Indeed, later in the proceedings, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police said they had not received any information 
from the U.S. that linked Hussein with terrorism. 
The extradition warrant cited an executive order issued by President Bush 
on the same day designating Hussein and two of his companies, Barakaat North 
America Inc. and Al Baraka Exchange LLC, among others, as “foreign per-
sons” to whom it would be illegal to provide financial or other services.64  Such 
 
 62. Section 2(1) states that a “person whose name is listed in the schedule is a person who there are 
reasonable grounds to believe (a) has carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated 
the carrying out of a terrorist activity,” (b) is controlled directly or indirectly by any person conducting 
any of the activities set out in paragraph (a); or (c) are acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, or in 
association with any person conducting any of the activities involved in paragraph (a).”  The Regula-
tions create two tracks of listed persons.  The first is directly linked to the list controlled by the 1267 
Committee, so that the names that appear on its list are directly incorporated into Canadian law.  The 
second track is contained in a Schedule created by Canadian authorities.  The maximum fine and 
maximum term of imprisonment are those set out by the United Nations Act.  In addition, Canada’s 
Anti-Terrorism Act, another reaction to September 11, amended the punishment provisions of the 
United Nations Act to increase the fine on conviction from $5000 to $100,000 and the maximum term 
of imprisonment from five to ten years. 
 63. See Dosman, supra note 52. 
 64. 2001 WL1420777 (F.D.I.C.).  This order added names to a list already issued by executive order 
on September 23, 2001, Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, primarily under the authority of Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977), but also claiming the authority of 
112905 05_DYZENHAUS.DOC 1/10/2006  10:26 AM 
Summer/Autumn 2005] THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW 143 
an executive order does not require a statement of reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that listed persons are engaged in terrorist activity.  Later that day, after 
Canada received the extradition warrant, Hussein and his companies, together 
with the other names listed on the presidential executive order, were listed in 
Canada through the schedule mechanism of the Canadian Terrorism Regula-
tions.  On November 9, Hussein was listed by the 1267 Committee of the Secu-
rity Council, which meant that he was listed three times under Canadian law: 
under earlier Afghanistan Regulations, also made under authority of the United 
Nations Act; under the first track of “listed persons” in the Terrorism Regula-
tions; and under the second track in the Terrorism Regulations because of the 
Schedule listing of November 7. 
Canadian government officials stated that the parallel offenses for which 
Hussein should be extradited were those of acting contrary to the Terrorism 
Regulations, specifically, knowingly providing or collecting funds for use by a 
listed person and providing financial services to a listed person.  Hussein’s of-
fense was having financial dealings with himself, as a listed person, and with his 
businesses.65  Extensive media coverage in both the U.S. and Canada linked 
Hussein with terrorism, with immediate negative consequences for his business 
activity in Canada. 
Hussein’s lawyers contested the extradition as contrary to Canada’s Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, relying on section 7, which deems a violation to take 
place when someone is deprived of his right to “life, liberty and security of the 
person” in a way that violates the “principles of fundamental justice.”  Since the 
Terrorism Regulations provide for imprisonment, they clearly pass the thresh-
old for deprivation of “life, liberty and security of the person.”  Regarding the 
second part of the test, the lawyers argued the Terrorism Regulations create 
criminal offenses—moreover, criminal offenses that are “inherently wrong” 
rather than mere “regulatory offen[s]es.”66  This, they argued, is precluded by 
section 7, for a principle “so ingrained” in the Canadian legal system—part of 
the “principle of legality” or the rule of law—is that all true crimes (offenses 
that prohibit intrinsically wrong conduct) are to be created only by legislation.  
Their argument here was a democratic one:  because of the stigmatization and 
serious consequences of true crimes, deeming conduct to be criminal had to be 
done in the “open air of Parliament rather than through administration.”67  Al-
though Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act creates similar offenses, they noted, it had 
been enacted as a statute only after full legislative debate.68 
 
various other statutes and United Nations Resolutions.  In Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in 
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, Harold Hongju Koh notes the 
Act was enacted in 1977 to curb executive abuses of national emergency powers but has become a vehi-
cle for the kind of exercise it was supposed to limit.  Id. at 1264-65. 
 65. Dosman, supra note 52, at 16. 
 66. Factum, supra note 52, at paras. 45-57. 
 67. Id. at paras. 58-71.   
 68. Id. The factum argues that laying regulations before Parliament is not a sufficient democratic 
safeguard. 
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Hussein’s lawyers next argued that the Terrorism Regulations contravene 
the presumption of innocence, protected by section 11(d) of the Charter, since 
they deem listed persons to be those for whom there are reasonable grounds to 
believe have carried out, attempted, facilitated, or otherwise been complicit in 
terrorist activity.  This amounts to legislatively presuming facts that would oth-
erwise have to be proved, removing the onus on the Crown to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that listed persons are in fact engaged in these activities.69 
Finally, the lawyers argued that the combination of Canada’s legislative, af-
ter-the-fact determination of Hussein’s criminality and the U.S.’s attempt to ex-
tradite him for a licensing offense, when in fact what it wanted was to question 
him about terrorism, amounted to an abuse of the Canadian judicial process 
that could not be countenanced at common law—an offense that had been sub-
sumed into the section 7 prohibition of deprivations that violated “principles of 
fundamental justice.”70 
The Canadian government decided to avoid the challenge in court and in-
stead amended the Terrorism Regulations to exempt Hussein.  Canadian offi-
cials had been in contact with U.S. officials and had concluded that Hussein 
should not be on the list because he was not connected to any terrorist activi-
ties.  This exemption meant that Canada was no longer in compliance with its 
obligations to the Security Council, and it also left Hussein subject to sanctions 
by other nations.  However, Canada succeeded in getting him taken off the Se-
curity Council list, thereby coming once more into compliance. 
The listing by the 1267 Committee did not play a direct role in creating the 
basis for an extradition order against Hussein, for his initial listing happened 
under the second track of the Terrorism Regulations, and on November 7 the 
Canadian government simply took over Bush’s executive order.  However, it is 
far from insignificant that the full title of these regulations includes “United Na-
tions,” that the regulations were made relying on the United Nations Act, and 
that the 1267 Committee in fact adopted the same list two days later, leaving 
Canada in non-compliance with its obligations to the Security Council once 
Hussein’s name was removed from the Canadian list.  What drove the whole 
process was the legitimacy and legal status that the Security Council and the 
United Nations as a whole enjoys in Canada.  Indeed, in the fairly heated de-
bate about whether it was appropriate for Canada to react to September 11th 
 
 69. Id. at paras. 72-78.  The Regulations thus in this respect also violated section 7.  The lawyers 
also argued that the Regulations violated section 2(d) of the Charter, which protects freedom of asso-
ciation, since they prevent association with listed persons in the absence of reasonable grounds to be-
lieve they are involved in terrorism, or penalizes “unwitting or innocent association with persons who 
are involved in terrorist activities.” Id. at paras. 79-96.  They submitted that Canada’s Extradition Act 
was constitutionally invalid to the extent that it permitted the retroactive application of legislation.  
That is, the Act permitted Hussein to be extradited for actions that were criminal at the time extradi-
tion was sought rather than at the time he did those things.  Retroactivity, especially criminal retroac-
tivity, is against the rule of law, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is intended to secure the rule of 
law.  “The primary mischief is avoidance of arbitrary and targeted use of legislation by the government 
of Canada to prejudice persons after they have already acted.”  Id. at paras. 98-114. 
 70. Id. at paras. 115-26. 
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with a terrorism statute—one that would become part of the ordinary law of the 
land—the argument that Canada was merely fulfilling its obligations to the in-
ternational community loomed large on the side of those who thought such leg-
islation necessary.71 
There is, then, a deep question about the legitimacy of the process the Secu-
rity Council put in place for listing terrorist individuals and entities—a question 
also about the legality of that process.72  The factum, or brief, put together by 
Hussein’s lawyers is fundamentally an argument about legality or the rule of 
law, although it is an argument made easier for them by the existence of an en-
trenched bill of rights.73 
That argument is clearest in its final limb about abuse of process, a section 
of the factum that unites the proceeding parts.  A crucial sentence from this part 
of the factum is the following: 
It was after Canadian officials received requests relating to [Hussein’s] arrest and ex-
tradition that the Government of Canada attempted to make arrest and extradition 
possible, not by creating an offence of general application, but by creating specific le-
gal prerequisites peculiar to the person whose extradition was being sought. This is not 
the case of an extradition respondent being caught by the misfortune of the creation of 
an offence of general application that . . . satisfies the double criminality requirement. 
It is the case of specific and targeted legislative action being taken to satisfy the double 
criminality requirement.74 
The basic charge here is that the listing mechanism is a “bill of attainder”—an 
administrative or legislative deeming of guilt.75 
One way of understanding the offense is in terms of the separation of pow-
ers:  it is the judiciary’s role to determine both guilt and appropriate punish-
ment in an open trial.  If this understanding is correct, it might seem that the 
idea of a bill of attainder has no purchase in the international context, precisely 
 
 71. See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Canada’s Obligations at International Criminal Law, in THE 
SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 353 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. 
eds., 2001). But see Jutta Brunnée, Terrorism and Legal Change:An International Law Lesson, id. at 
341. 
 72. For an analysis sympathetic to this kind of argument, see Andrea Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the 
Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 263, 269-72 (2002). 
 73. At para. 58 of the Edelson and Paciocco Factum, supra note 52, the lawyers observe that the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms permits them to avoid relying on a constitutional convention argument 
about the impropriety of the legislature conferring legislative powers on the executive, an argument 
rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court in In re Grey, [1918] 57 S.C.R. 150 (Can.).  See Peter W. 
Hogg, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 14.1(d) – (14.2(a) (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2004).  That the 
lawyers did not choose to rely on an argument akin to the one outlined below does not undermine it, 
for reasons explored in the text. 
 74. Factum, supra note 52, at para. 125. 
 75. As the author of a 1962 Note in the Yale Law Journal explains, the term “act” or “bill of at-
tainder” comes from the practice in sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century England of using 
statutes to sentence “to death, without a conviction in the ordinary course of judicial trial, named or 
described persons or groups.”  Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to 
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).  In addition, the term came to be used for “bills of 
pains and penalties,” statutes that imposed sanctions less than capital.  Id. at 331.  Both sorts of statutes 
were aimed at revolutionaries and were considered offensive to the rule of law because they attempted 
to bypass the courts by establishing a system of either legislative or administrative conviction and pun-
ishment. 
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because of what one might think of as the international order’s institutional 
immaturity, the lack of analogies to the institutions that in domestic legal orders 
together make up the separation of powers.76 
However, Resolution 1267 has been described as legislative in nature.77  Two 
questions arise from this description.  One might ask on what authority the Se-
curity Council legislated and, in particular, used legislation to delegate authority 
to the 1267 Committee to make its lists.  Second, one has to ask about the legal 
nature of the 1267 Committee.  As a body that has been delegated authority by 
the Security Council, its authority looks administrative. But the Committee is 
also charged with determining who should figure on a list that, as long as states 
take their obligations to the Security Council seriously, will result in severe con-
sequences to the individuals so named.  Its function thus looks in part judicial, 
since it is making determinations equivalent to a finding of guilt, or a function 
that, at the least, will play a significant role in such determinations when states 
comply with their obligations.  In substance, however, its process is not in any 
way judicial; rather, it seems one whereby names are merely transferred to the 
list from a list compiled by one country’s security service. 
In one view, the answer to the first question has to be found in the Charter 
of the U.N., in which authority to delegate, if any, will be either stated expressly 
or implied.78  However, if the delegated authority was flawed from the perspec-
 
 76. See, e.g., DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER 
CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE 276-77 (2001).  Schweigman discusses the question of when Council decisions are ultra 
vires.  The options he contemplates for who should declare decisions to be ultra vires are states and the 
International Court of Justice.  He warns against domestic analogies, saying that “For one thing, the 
trias politica . . . is (as yet) not applicable in the international sphere.  In other words, there is no dis-
tinction between the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers known to national systems.”  Id. 
at 276-77.  But see IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ch. 15 (1998).  
Brownlie, relying in part on Hersch Lauterpacht, argues that the domestic analogies are apt even if no 
adequate institutional means exist to remedy violations of the rule of law.  Brownlie outlines several 
criteria of legality or non-arbitrariness which would bind the Security Council; see especially his discus-
sion of the ultra vires doctrine in relation to the Security Council’s exercise of its Chapter VII powers.  
Id. at 217-25. 
 77. Szasz, supra note 54;  see also text accompanying note 54, supra. 
 78. In a review of a book by Danesh Sarooshi about the Security Council’s delegation of its Chap-
ter VII powers, Bardo Fassbender reproduces Sarooshi’s quotation of Hans Kelsen’s remark that, “No 
organ can legally delegate power to another organ without being authorised by the constitution to do 
so.”  DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 20, n.81 
(1999), reviewed by Bardo Fassbender, Quis judicabit? The Security Council: Its Powers and Its Legal 
Control, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 228-32 (2000), quoting at 231, HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 142 (1950).  Fassbender 
says this remark provides the right point of departure for the idea of delegation in this context: “[A] 
recognition first of the Charter as the constitution of the international community, second of the Secu-
rity Council as an organ of that community established by the constitution, and third of the proposi-
tion . . . that in the absence of an express or implicit authorisation by the constitution an organ is not 
entitled to delegate its power to another organ or entity. . . .  The next task would then have been to 
interpret the U.N. Charter in order to determine the existence, possible scope, and limitations of such 
an authorisation, taking into account the Charter’s singularity as well as its affinity to other constitu-
tional documents.”  Fassbender, at 231-32 (footnote omitted). 
112905 05_DYZENHAUS.DOC 1/10/2006  10:26 AM 
Summer/Autumn 2005] THE RULE OF (ADMINISTRATIVE) LAW 147 
tive of the rule of law, then, whether the Security Council has a general author-
ity to legislate or not, the legislation itself would be flawed in the same way.79 
Legality and legitimacy are deeply implicated in the common law of judicial 
review since public exercises of power are lawful on condition that they do not 
violate these values and principles.  Moreover, what is meant by public exercise 
of power is not confined to executive action under the authority of statute.   
Even in a legal order that lacks a written constitution of any sort, the legislature 
is answerable to the same set of values and principles.  If a domestic court has 
good rule-of-law reasons to resist an extradition order based on the listing 
mechanism of the 1267 Committee, then its refusal to accord authority to that 
mechanism indicates a failure of legality the Security Council must remedy be-
fore its legislation will merit respect.  In addition, assuming that listing a person 
in this manner is an illegal act, in principle, one who has been listed and who 
has suffered as a result would be able to claim damages from the institutions 
that had participated in this process.  Of course, if the U.N. were to be sued, it 
would rely on the doctrine of immunity.80  However, the doctrine of immunity, 
 
 79. The idea of constitutionalism that is relied on here is quite different from the one that seems to 
be at stake in current debates among international lawyers about to draw on the title of a paper by 
Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
193 (2004).  Those engaged in the search for such analogies are generally looking for a constitution in 
the sense of a founding document, preferably one that includes a bill of rights, whereas the unwritten 
constitution consists in the values and principles that together make up the idea of the rule of law or 
legality.  I do, however, want to adapt Helfer’s suggestion that one of the ways in which international 
norms become constitutional is through judicial interpretation.  He argues that the European Court of 
Justice, in taking references from national courts for a preliminary ruling on European Community law 
and then proclaiming doctrines which had direct analogies in domestic constitutional jurisprudence, 
bolstered the authority of the European Community’s legislative and executive arms and at the same 
time elevated itself into the position of a kind of constitutional court.  Id. at 200.  Similarly, he argues 
that the tribunal structure of the World Trade Organization, especially its Appellate Body, has also en-
dowed the various treaties governing that organization with constitutional status, although not with the 
same status as the Treaty of Rome.  Id. at 201-02.  The rulings of the Appellate Body are not enforce-
able as a matter of private right before domestic courts.  The global scope of the WTO has made it 
more difficult for it to reach a kind of constitutional consensus on meta-norms, and jurists have found it 
more appropriate to present their ruling as enforcing bargains between states rather than as filling in 
the gaps in an emerging constitution.  Id. at 203.  This adaptation is largely a negative one in the sense 
that a different kind of constitutionalism emerges when domestic courts refuse to enforce decisions 
made by international bodies for rule of law reasons. 
 80. Relevant here is the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was detained in the U.S. in 
September 2002 while in transit to Canada.  According to Arar, he was very aggressively interrogated 
by U.S. officials seeking to determine alleged links to terrorist groups.  He was threatened with depor-
tation to Syria, his country of origin, which he protested against because of his fear that he would be 
tortured there.  He was sent first to Jordan, where he was beaten by Jordanian officials, and then to 
Syria, where he was detained and tortured.  Over a year later, having made a full “confession,” he was 
released and allowed to return to Canada.  Arar is now seeking redress against Syria and Jordan by su-
ing these governments in Canada.  His lawyer has been granted leave to intervene as an added party in 
the appeal against the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Bouzari v. Iran, 2002 
Carswell Ont. 1469.  In Bouzari, the court, in a rather unimaginative judgment, held that Canada’s 
State Immunity Act, R.S.C., ch. S-18 (1985), which provides foreign states with immunity from the ju-
risdiction of Canadian courts, bars Bouzari’s claim against Iran for the torture he suffered at the hands 
of Iranian officials.  Bouzari’s lawyers argued, inter alia, that developments in international law, in par-
ticular, the absolute prohibition against torture and the emerging sense in international law that there 
should be a right of redress for such acts in domestic law, required the court to find an exception to the 
immunity granted by the statute.  The lawyers admitted that the position they were advocating was 
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whether of states or international organizations, is overdue for revision when 
the legal wrong for which redress is sought is a violation of human rights.81 
As was argued on behalf of Abbasi, an international standard of a human 
right of access to a court is emerging, a right recognized in the constitutional law 
of many legal orders.82  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has now gone some 
way towards recognizing such a right, both in asserting in Rasul v. Bush83 the ju-
risdiction of federal courts over the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and in hold-
ing in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld84 that those designated as “enemy combatants” by the 
Bush administration have a constitutional entitlement to some minimum of due 
process in order to permit them to contest that designation.  Both decisions can 
be seen as continuing a tradition of common-law judicial protection of liberty, 
informed to some extent by an awareness of norms of international law.85 
Even if the Canadian government were to react to a judicial decision that 
accepted Hussein’s legal arguments by legislating the listing mechanism into the 
criminal law, its doing so would not affect the merits of the rule of law argu-
ments.  Indeed, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism statute took over in large part the Ter-
rorism Regulations made under the United Nations Act.  The statute provides 
that the Cabinet may list a group as a terrorist group if it is “satisfied” there are 
“reasonable grounds to believe” the person has been involved in terrorist activ-
 
based on an argument about where international law was progressing and should be progressing.  How-
ever, they also argued both that torture is an act that cannot be characterized as a legitimate exercise of 
state authority and that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in particular section 7,  makes it inconsis-
tent for Canada to grant immunity to a state for acts that are not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.  I am grateful to Lorne Waldman, Arar’s lawyer, for providing me with the mate-
rials on which this note is based.  Arar has also filed suit in the Eastern District of New York, asserting 
that Attorney General John Ashcroft and others violated his “constitutional, civil and international 
human rights,” including those rights protected under the Torture Victims Protection Act.  Arar v. 
Ashcroft, Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Jan. 22, 2004 (E.D.N.Y.), citing Torture Victim 
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991). 
 81. See AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 281 
(2000).  Reinisch claims there is an “apparent contradiction between the international-law-based hu-
man right of access to court and the restriction of such access by the concept of immunity.”  Id. at 282.  
He notes it is surprising that this contradiction is rarely discussed, though he cites as an exception Lau-
terpacht’s 1951 article, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States, B.Y. 28 (1951), re-
printed in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 315 
(Elihu Lauterpacht ed., Cambridge University Press 1977) [hereinafter INT’L LAW], id. at n.147, in 
which Lauterpacht argued that with the “recognition of human freedoms as part of positive interna-
tional law . . . it may be opportune to re-examine the problem of jurisdictional immunities of foreign 
States.”  Id. at 317.  It is worth noting here the analogy between this kind of claim and that accepted by 
the English courts in the Pinochet matter, that the immunity traditionally granted heads and former 
heads of state should not in principle be a bar to a legal claim when the violation of human rights is in 
issue.  As Ruth Wedgwood has pointed out, the idea of immunity that gets in the way here is analogous 
to the idea of prerogative power.  Ruth Wedgwood, International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 
40 VA.  J. INT’L LAW 829, 839-40 (2000). 
 82. Reinisch, supra note 81, at 281. 
 83. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
 84. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
 85. However, the meager amount of due process indicated by the plurality in Hamdi as constitu-
tionally appropriate, as well as the plurality regarding a Congressional resolution as sufficient warrant 
for detention, are deeply troubling holdings. 
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ity.86  Judicial review is available after a group has been listed, but the group 
seeking review is not entitled to all the information before the judge.  Further, 
the Solicitor General can withdraw the information, with the effect that the 
judge must pretend it does not exist when determining the reasonableness of 
the decision to list.87  This procedure seems to amount to an usurpation of judi-
cial independence, invoking again the idea of a bill of attainder.88 
Nevertheless, a common-law court does not always have the authority to in-
validate legislation because it amounts to a bill of attainder.  Even if protection 
against such bills is constitutionally entrenched, as in Article I, Section 9, of the 
American Constitution, which states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law 
shall be passed,” it will often be controversial whether a particular statute 
amounts to such a bill. 
It is important to note that the listing mechanisms initiated by the 1267 
Committee  replicate the U.S. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act of 
1999 (the Kingpin Act),89 which aimed to generalize the practice of sanctioning 
Colombian Drug traffickers by Presidential Executive Order.  This Act pro-
vides for the imposition of economic sanctions on a world-wide basis against 
major international narcotics traffickers, their organizations, and the foreign in-
dividuals and entities that provide support for them.  It established a two-tiered 
system: the first, permitting the President to designate foreign persons deemed 
to be drug “kingpins” for sanctions; and the second, permitting the Secretary of 
the Treasury to designate “foreign persons” deemed to be facilitating the activi-
ties of the kingpins.  The Act requires that property subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
of designated individuals be blocked, prohibits U.S. individuals from dealing 
with designated individuals, and subjects violations of the Act to a range of civil 
and criminal penalties.  The Act explicitly precludes judicial review of the des-
ignations, though it does permit review of the civil penalties.  On January 23, 
2001, the Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, which was es-
tablished by the Act, submitted a final report on the Act to Congress.90 
Although the Commission recommended that judicial review, along with an 
internal system of administrative review, be introduced into the system, the ma-
jority of the Commission rejected the claim that the Kingpin Act amounted to a 
bill of attainder.  On its understanding of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, the 
Commission concluded that a bill of attainder has to be a law that is both spe-
cific and imposes punishment.91  It argued that because the executive, not the 
legislature, names individuals, the constitutional protection against such bills 
 
      86.   See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 87. See Dosman, supra note 52, at 21. 
 88. KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA 36-38 (2003). 
 89. Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1626 (1999). 
 90. Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, Final Report to Congress, G.P.O. Item 
No. 1089, submitted to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence on Jan. 23, 2001 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.law.stetson.edu/ Judicial Review Commission (last visited June 25, 2005). 
 91. Id. at 95. 
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does not apply, since they constrain legislative, not executive, action.92  In addi-
tion, the Commission concluded the Act was not punitive in the required sense, 
since blocked assets could be released; the Act was related to goals other than 
punishment; there was no basis for inferring Congress’s subjective intent to 
punish; and any criminal penalties would be imposed by federal courts based on 
“rules of general applicability” laid down by the legislature.93 
Commissioner David B. Smith delivered a minority report much more 
damning of the Act.94  He discussed the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,95 which concerned a list prepared 
by the Attorney General under the authority of an executive order of “commu-
nist” or “subversive” organizations.  The list was forwarded to the “Loyalty Re-
view Board” of the Civil Service Commission, which used it to weed commu-
nists and subversives out of government.  Further, no opportunity to challenge 
one’s listing was offered.96 
Smith highlighted his agreement with Justice Black, who thought it absurd 
to suppose that the Constitution would deny the legislature the opportunity to 
do something odious while permitting the executive to do the very same thing.  
As Smith pointed out, even if Black were wrong on this point of doctrine, he 
was right on substance, since the real issue is the determination of guilt.  Indeed, 
he was a fortiori right since the executive branch operates under fewer con-
straints than the legislative branch.97  In Smith’s view, the penalties imposed 
through the Kingpin Act made it even more susceptible to characterization as a 
bill of attainder than the process impugned in McGrath.  He was unimpressed 
by the claim that assets were only blocked, not expropriated.98 
Where the majority of the Commission went wrong was in viewing the issue 
through the optic of the formal separation of powers.99  However, more impor-
tant was that their recommendations make it plain that they fully appreciated 
the problems for the rule of law created by the Act and so saw the need for far-
reaching reform.  Hence, the point is not so much about whether a statute is 
correctly characterized as a bill of attainder, or whether, if it is so characterized, 
judges are entitled to invalidate it.  For the label “bill of attainder” merely seeks 
to specify one particular kind of affront to the rule of law.  The argument 
against bills of attainder is that the statute at issue offends the constitutional 
guarantee, written or unwritten, of an independent judiciary presiding in open 
 
 92. Id. at 96-97. 
 93. Id. at 98-100. 
 94. Id., Additional Views of Commissioner David B. Smith. 
 95. 314 U.S. 123 (1951). 
 96. See Smith, supra note 94, at 38. 
 97. Id. at 39, n.59. 
 98. Id. at 38-42. 
 99. For discussion of analogous problems, see the discussion of the issues arising out of the Austra-
lian Parliament’s legislative ban of the Communist Party, invalidated in Australian Communist Party v. 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.  David Dyzenhaus, Constituting the Enemy: A Response to Carl 
Schmitt, in MILITANT DEMOCRACY 15 (Andras Sajo ed., 2004). 
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court over determinations of guilt and punishment.100  A bill of attainder is just 
“the paradigmatic example of legislation whose violation of the principles of 
equality and due process contravenes the rule of law.”101  The repugnance of 
such statutes to the common-law tradition is born of the idea that while a legis-
lature can enact into law its understandings of subversion and other offenses, 
the rule of law requires both that the offence be framed generally and that any-
one accused of such an offense be tried in a court of law.102  In other words, the 
argument is a deeply normative one, which is not as much about the separation 
of powers as it is about the reasons for the separation of powers.  The constitu-
tional role of the judges is to guard the civil rights of the individual, here both 
the right to a fair trial and the right to be treated as equal before the law.  If 
judges cannot carry out their constitutional duty, it does not follow that they 
have no such duty.  What does follow is that legal reform is required in order 
for the legal order to maintain its claim to be such, to be an order governed by 
the rule of law. 
That legislatures must be so restricted in order for a legal order to maintain 
its legitimacy is controversial in common-law jurisdictions.  In the absence of 
express constitutional constraints on legislative authority, many lawyers in 
common-law jurisdictions assume that the legislature is supreme because there 
are no legal constraints other than constraints of manner and form on legisla-
tion.  Whatever one might think is wrong with the content of a statute, as long 
as the legislature observes the constraints of manner and form, there can be no 
complaint from the rule of law perspective about the statute’s legality, since le-
gality is just a matter of compliance with these rules.  But there is more to the 
idea of legality than such compliance. 
This tale of the evolution of the common law of judicial review—the rule of 
the principles of administrative law—is, then, not just about a change in judicial 
thinking; it is also about institutional design, about how institutions, including 
the administrative state, should function if domestic legal order is to meet the 
imperative of the rule of law as understood in the era of human rights.  The role 
of the judiciary in this tale is not supposed to lead to the conclusion that judges 
are the most important legal actors, nor that they should always have the last 
word about the interpretation of law.  The cases merely afford an opportunity 
for reflection on the pathologies of legal order, so that one can also reflect on 
how a better institutional design might help ensure official accountability to the 
values of the rule of law. 
In order for such reflection to be productive, one has to move away from the 
notion that the rule of law is maintained by a formal separation of powers that 
imposes checks and balances on government.  Rather, the separation of powers 
is to be regarded as the realization of, in Kantian terms, a republican ideal.  In 
 
 100. This is argued by T.R.S. Allan in the leading theoretical treatment on the rule of law.  T.R.S. 
ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 148-60 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 148. 
 102. Id. at 154. 
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Heiner Bielefeldt’s translation of the well-known passage from Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace, “Republicanism is the political principle of separation of the executive 
power (the government) from the legislative power; despotism is that of the 
high-handed management of the state by laws the regent has himself given, in-
asmuch as he handles the public will as his private will.”103  As Bielefeldt ex-
plains, the republican ideal seeks to prevent the general will from getting “lost 
in the problems of everyday power politics.”104  It is, then, “not an external im-
position on a republic of self-legislating citizens, but instead makes up the inner 
quality of a polity that proceeds in accordance with the underlying normative 
principle of republican self-legislation—that is, the united lawgiving will of the 
people.”105  In this way, the separation of powers is not, or is not only, an exter-
nal means of moderating legislation.  Rather, it is an internal means of institu-
tionalizing republican self-control and self-criticism “with regard to the basic 
normative principle of the legal order in general—namely, the ‘innate right’ of 
every human being, which is to be spelled out in republican legislation.”106 
However, the claim is not that international law is best explained as a Kant-
ian order of right.  Rather, from the perspective of the rule of law, the reasons 
for having a separation of powers are more important than any particular ar-
rangement of powers.  Put differently, violations of the rule of law are to be de-
termined by looking to the substantive values that the separation of powers are 
supposed to protect rather than to whether the particular arrangement of pow-
ers in a legal order has been disturbed.  Such a failure faces those who could 
trigger the process of reform which would make a remedy possible with the 
question whether they wish to make a choice for the rule of law.  If no remedy 
is available, then the rule of law has failed.  If those who can trigger the process 
of remedial reform choose the values underlying the rule of law over the ex-
pression of its arrangement, they should design and install institutions that 
make it possible for legal authorities to exercise their power according to a rule 
of law that rests on such values.107  At the least, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized in Rasul and Hamdi, there must be some governmental body with 
jurisdiction over the matter that affords those affected by a public decision the 
opportunity to have their cases properly heard. 
Without such institutions in place, legal order is, to evoke the first sentence 
of Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”, in a state of 
self-incurred immaturity.108   
 
 103. HEINER BIELEFELDT, SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION IN KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 111 
(2003). For the standard English translation, see IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH, reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 101 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. 
Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 1991) (1795). 
 104. BIELEFELDT, supra note 103, at 112. 
 105. Id. (emphasis removed).  
 106. Id. at 113-14. 
 107. See Bianchi, supra note 72, at 269-72. 
 108. Immanuel Kant, reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 103, at 54 (1784). 
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III 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The law of nature has been rightly exposed to the charge of vagueness and arbitrari-
ness.  But the uncertainty of the ‘higher law’ is preferable to the arbitrariness and inso-
lence of naked force.  These considerations explain the significance of this aspect of 
the Grotian tradition in the history of the Law of Nations.  [Grotius] secularized the 
law of nature.  He gave it added authority and dignity by making it an integral part of 
the exposition of a system of law which became essential to civilized life.  By doing this 
he laid, more truly than any other writer before him, the foundations of international 
law.109 
The idea that international legal order can, in certain respects, be consid-
ered immature is inspired by a remark of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in The Devel-
opment of International Law by the International Court.110  Lauterpacht starts 
the section in which he discusses what he calls “Judicial Legislation Through 
Application of General Principles of Law”111 by noting that international law, 
“being an immature legal system, departs in some ways from principles of law as 
generally recognized.”112  Writing some forty years later, Thomas Franck asserts 
that international law has recently “attained the status of a mature, complex 
system with rules and processes every bit as variegated as those of a nation.” 113  
It is a “complete legal system.”114  So confident is he of this claim that he says in-
ternational lawyers can now move away from the traditional question on which 
they focused—“Is international law law?”—and ask questions about its efficacy, 
its enforceability, its comprehensibility, and, the question Franck finds most im-
portant, “Is international law fair?”115 
A good case can be made for the continuing immaturity of international law 
in the failure of international organizations to provide controls of the rule of 
law, which are the mark of a mature legal order.116  These controls are anchored 
in the values of fairness, which in common-law legal orders have been devel-
oped by judges who have shown how public administration can be subject to the 
rule of law.  The failure to put the controls in place is, then, the way in which 
this kind of immaturity is self-incurred.  However, how one conceives fairness 
depends fundamentally on one’s answer to the question, “What is law?”  Thus, 
the question from which Franck hopes international law can escape reemerges 
 
 109. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 
(1946), reprinted in 2 INT’L LAW, supra note 81, at 333. 
 110. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958). 
 111. Id. at 158-72. 
 112. Id. at 158.  One should not be misled by his use of the word “legislation” to describe what 
judges do. Lauterpacht is not adopting a positivistic view of adjudication as a practice in which judges 
create law on the basis of their own subjective preferences.  For him, legislation was little more than a 
term of convenience for judicial development of the law on the basis of existing principles.  See, e.g., id. 
at 155-57, 166-67. 
 113. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 5 (1995). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 6. 
 116.  See Part II.B.2, supra.  
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within international law, perhaps because of the very maturity it has achieved.  
Indeed, the necessity of this question, and that it will reemerge whether one is 
confronting the phenomenon of international law or law in general, shows the 
distinction Franck draws between legitimacy and justice is not as firm as he al-
leges.117 
Lauterpacht’s concern in his book was rather different—the failure of gov-
ernments to fully join the international legal order.  Governments had failed to 
fully “avail[ ] themselves” of international law’s potential “for justice”118 by not 
consenting more often to the World Court’s jurisdiction.  This concern was the 
product of Lauterpacht’s optimism about international law and international 
adjudication.  Although he recognized that “law is not a panacea and that not 
all causes of international conflict or tension can be settled by law,” he still held 
that once a dispute is submitted for judicial determination, “the principle of the 
completeness of the legal order fully applies, with the result that all disputes 
thus submitted are capable of a legal solution.”119 
Lauterpacht’s optimism about law, and his thought that judges have an im-
portant role both in developing the principles of the rule of law and in ensuring 
that the principles are protected, are attractive.  In addition, the three principles 
he identified as general principles of law are part of a package of common-law 
rights.120  The first is nemo judex in re sua, that no one should be judge in his 
own cause, of which Lauterpacht remarks, with regret, that “[n]o rule is more 
firmly embedded in the practice of modern international law than the principle 
that States are not bound, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, to 
submit their disputes with other States to final adjudication by a third party.”121  
The second principle is abuse of right, which Lauterpacht says must “exist in the 
background in any system of administration of justice in which courts are not 
purely mechanical agencies.”122  One cannot determine by reference to an ab-
stract legislative rule when the exercise of a legal right “has degenerated into 
abuse of a right” and thus requires the “activity of courts drawing the line in 
each particular case.”123  Moreover, this activity is particularly important in in-
ternational society “in which the legislative process by regular organs is practi-
 
 117. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).  See also 
Lauterpacht, The Nature of International Law and General Jurisprudence, in 2 INT’L LAW, supra note 
81, at 7-8.  Lauterpacht asks the question, “Shall international law aim at improvement by trying to 
bring its rules within the compass of the generally accepted notion of law, or shall it disintegrate it and 
thus deprive itself of a concrete ideal of perfection?”  As he points out, this question “transcends the 
limits of a problem of international law” and becomes a “problem of general jurisprudence.”  Id. at 8. 
 118. Lauterpacht, supra note 110, at 4-5. 
 119. Id. 
    120. See Part II.A., supra.  
 121. Id. at 158. 
 122. Id. at 165.  In the common law of judicial review, requirements that discretion be exercised 
fairly and reasonably are functional equivalents of what Lauterpacht has in mind as protections against 
abuse of right. 
 123. Id. at 162. 
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cally non-existent.”124  Finally, he discusses the principle of estoppel, which he 
takes to stand for the moral claim that a “person may—having regard to the ob-
ligation to act in good faith and the corresponding right of others to rely on his 
conduct—be bound by his own act.”125  “Like law as a whole,” he writes, “so also 
‘general principles of law’ are in substance, an expression of what has been de-
scribed as socially realizable morality.  In legal history, courts—as distinguished 
from formal legislation—have been mainly responsible for the infusion of mor-
als into law”.126 
In one sense the international legal order can be said to have reached a 
stage of moral enlightenment, compared to which domestic legal orders seem 
immature.  I mean here the development of international human rights law, 
which together with older conventions like the Geneva Convention often these 
days seems to provide the most powerful grammar for moral criticism of the 
practice of nation states, either for their failure to commit to these norms or for 
their failure to live up to their commitments.  However, just as it might be ap-
propriate to condemn countries for failing to join or for flouting the values of 
the moral community of those who respect human rights, so perhaps should in-
ternational bodies be criticized if or when they create norms without putting in 
place the kind of institutional mechanisms that mature domestic systems take 
for granted.  From the perspective of the international law of human rights, the 
question might seem to be one about how to bring all nations fully into the 
normative moral community.  From the perspective of domestic legal orders, 
the question might seem to be one about how to bring the international legal 
order fully into the legal institutional community.127 
A similar point is made in Hans Kelsen’s treatment of international law.128  
He argues international law is a “primitive” system, in that it lacks organs for 
creating and applying legal norms, and so has to rely on the members of the in-
ternational legal community to create norms and on individual states to enforce 
them.129  He also argues it is the “primitive man” who, noticing conflicts between 
the norms of his legal community and those of the international community, 
concludes not only that there is a dualism of legal orders, but that his commu-
nity has primacy—an attitude that Kelsen compares to one who considers that 
“all those not belonging to his community” are “lawless ‘barbarians’” and 
which, he says, does not really regard international law as true “law.”130  Like 
 
 124. Lauterpacht, supra note 109, at 162. 
 125. Id. at 172.  The doctrine of legitimate expectations is a functional equivalent here, in addition 
to the developing idea of public law estoppel. 
 126. Id. at 171-72. 
 127. This echoes terminology used in P.F. Strawson’s essay, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. 
BRIT. ACAD., reprinted in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (Methuen & Company 
1974) (1962). 
 128. The argument relies here on just one, though a very central, work in Kelsen’s corpus, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 107-25 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & 
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992), translated from REINE RECHTSLEHRE (1934). 
 129. Id. at 108-09, 113-14. 
 130. Id. at 113-14. 
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Lauterpacht, Kelsen postulated not only the unity of legal order but also its 
completeness.  Where they parted company, as is well known, and as the epi-
graph to this section tells us, is that Lauterpacht thought the best way to under-
stand international law is as law founded on a secularized law of nature.  What 
Lauterpacht shared with Kelsen requires, as Lauterpacht claimed, a basis in 
secularized natural law. 
The issue at stake here can be elaborated by attending to the The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations,131 in which Martti Koskenniemi tells a fascinating story 
about the “rise and fall of international law” out of the interaction between 
politics, legal practice, and scholarship.  The book ends on two discordant notes.  
On the one hand, it criticizes romantic accounts of the rule of law:  it is an anti-
formalist deconstruction of law’s boast to constrain politics, which results in a 
kind of realist, even pessimistic view, influenced by Carl Schmitt and Hans 
Morgenthau, that law, especially international law, is subordinate to power poli-
tics.  On the other hand, it sounds a more optimistic note:  a decision to adopt 
the rhetoric of law imposes a kind of civilizing discipline on interaction, whether 
between individuals or states, a discipline that is worth having because it can as-
sist in an emancipatory project capable of constructing an international com-
munity that will give “voice to those who are otherwise routinely excluded.”132 
Koskenniemi’s last substantive chapter, which strikes the Schmittian note, is 
preceded by a chapter on Lauterpacht, who exemplifies the romantic, cosmo-
politan view of the rule of international law.  Koskenniemi’s treatment of Lau-
terpacht is as respectful as it is critical.  One can discern from this respect more 
than just careful scholarship on a formidable figure in the discipline—a kind of 
yearning for the possibility of “a morality of sweet reasonableness.”133  Kosken-
niemi is keen to emphasize both the pragmatic aspect of Lauterpacht’s con-
structivist understanding of international law and that Lauterpacht’s view of law 
was not the kind of natural law in which general principles are derived from, 
say, a “Thomistic, religious morality.”  Rather, following Grotius, it is a “moral-
ity of attitude . . . a morality of putting one’s foot down when everybody’s ar-
guments have been given a hearing.”134 
An analogy to this idea, reminiscent of the Weberian distinction between an 
ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility, is to be found in Kelsen’s 
claim that one has to choose between the primacy of international law and the 
primacy of domestic law, the choice being dictated, in his view, by one’s ethical 
stance.  Kelsen, as a pacifist dedicated to affirming the autonomy of the individ-
ual, opted for the primacy of international law.  Lauterpacht did not think that 
such a choice had to be made.  Rather, one simply chooses law, putting one’s 
foot down for legal order, whether international or domestic.  Legal order could 
 
 131. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001). 
 132. Id. at 517. 
 133. Id. at 410. 
 134. Id.  
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not, he thought, be understood without reference to natural law.  This thought 
is as important for resisting Kelsen’s dichotomy as for resisting the idea that the 
choice is between rule-of-law cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and realism 
and pragmatism, on the other.  Rather, as Koskenniemi might be taken to sug-
gest, one can be a pragmatist and regard a commitment to a fairly substantive or 
natural law account of the rule of law as required.135 
As indicated in the epigraph to this section, Lauterpacht was well aware of 
the history of the abuse of the category of natural law.  In a brilliant 1933 essay 
on Kelsen,136 Lauterpacht recognized why Kelsen turned away from natural law, 
rightly suspecting that Kelsen, despite his claims about the scientific status of 
the Pure Theory of Law and his rejection of natural law, was inspired by his de-
sire for the “affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of man.”137  For that dig-
nity to be respected, law must be seen as a “free creation of the human legisla-
tor and judge,” not as an “imperfect attempt at reproduction of the law in itself, 
of a natural law above the positive law.”138 
However, as Lauterpacht shows, Kelsen, while committing himself to the 
fundamental postulate of legal order as a unity, bound together by his Grund-
norm, wished to claim that the Grundnorm is not a precept of natural law.  
Rather, it is a hypothesis of the legal scientist, one that translates might into 
right, but without any ethical consequence.  The subsequent emptiness of the 
idea means the hypothesis works out for judges as an authorization to use dis-
cretion to decide cases about the interpretation of the law, whereas discretion 
means they rely on their own subjective preferences.  The assumption of the 
unity and completeness of legal order turns out to be no constraint on judges at 
all, to provide no discipline on the elaboration of what the law requires.139 
Lauterpacht makes the further point that as we look at how judges elaborate 
the law in their interpretations, we find that in the “daily activity of courts[,] 
homage is paid to the fact that law is the realization of socially obtainable jus-
tice—which means of the socially obtainable natural law.”140  His position does 
not require judges to have the last word about what counts as a valid law, but 
about the way in which judicial interpretation necessarily conditions the exer-
cise of legal authority.  “We may have abandoned,” he says, “the theory that 
statutes repugnant to natural justice are void, but that does not mean that we 
have ceased to shape positive law and to interpret it, sometimes out of recogni-
 
 135. See Bianchi, supra note 72, at 264-65. 
 136. Hersch Lauterpacht, Kelsen’s Pure Science of Law, in MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 105 (W. 
Ivor Jennings ed., 1993). 
 137. Id. at 131. 
 138. Id. 
 139. For this reason, Richard Posner’s recent sympathetic treatment of Kelsen overestimates the 
extent to which Kelsen’s “concept of law is closer to judges’ conception of their role than [H.L.A.] 
Hart’s is.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (2003).  Posner also 
does not see that the substantive emptiness of Kelsen’s theory does not allow Kelsen to distinguish, as 
Posner does, between “law” and “rule of law.”  Id. at 281.  To make that distinction one needs precisely 
the kind of Fullerian idea of an internal morality of law that Posner dismisses.  Id. at 282. 
 140. Lauterpacht, supra note 136, at 133. 
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tion, by ideas for which the term natural law is an elastic and convenient expres-
sion.”141 
Lauterpacht’s view of international law, and of law in general—that once a 
dispute is submitted for judicial determination, “the principle of the complete-
ness of the legal order fully applies, with the result that all disputes thus submit-
ted are capable of a legal solution,”142—is deeply opposed to the Hobbesian one.  
As Koskenniemi has noted, Lauterpacht’s is very much a common-law view, 
which contests the idea that the international domain is a lawless state of nature 
in which the only obligations are those to which states consent.143  According to 
that view,  there are no black holes in international legal order except insofar as 
international actors have failed to design the institutions appropriate for main-
taining legal order, or insofar as states have failed to submit to the jurisdiction 
of existing institutions. 
For example, in his essay “The Grotian Tradition in International Law”144  
Lauterpacht finds Grotius’ contribution to the perennial problems of interna-
tional law to reside in the following insights:  First, the problems of interna-
tional law must be understood as problems of law in general.  Grotius’ exposi-
tion of international law is “woven into the structure of a general system of law 
and jurisprudence—a significant affirmation of the unity of all law and of the fi-
nal place of international law in the general scheme of legal science.”145  Second, 
the “totality of the relations between States is governed by law . . . .  There are 
no lacunae in that subjection of States to the rule of law.” 146  Here, Lauterpacht 
emphasizes Grotius’ rejection of any absolute right of the state to self-
preservation through his insistence on the distinction between just and unjust 
war.  Third, there is Grotius’ view “that the law . . . binding upon States is not 
solely the product of their express will.”147  The precept pacta sunt servanda is 
not the product of a practice whereby states consent to be bound by interna-
tional law, but instead makes possible that practice.  In other words, law is itself 
constitutive of the practice, and so Grotius argued that the precept is one, “per-
haps the main precept of natural law.”  Lauterpacht remarks that in interna-
tional society,  
deprived of normal legislative and judicial organs—the function of natural law, what-
ever may be its form, must approximate more closely to that of a direct source of law.  
In the absence of the overriding authority of the judicial and legislative organs of the 
State, the persuasive but potent authority of reason and principle derived from the 
fact of the necessary coexistence of a plurality of States148   
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 131, at 369. 
 144. Lauterpacht, supra note 109. 
 145. Id. at 326. 
 146. Id. at 327-28. 
 147. Id. at 329. 
 148. Id. at 331. 
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Lauterpacht shows how Grotius thus rejected altogether the idea that “rea-
son of State” could be invoked as the basis of international law, and he suggests 
that modern theories of international law as a law of coordination between 
states have a direct affinity with the “reason of State” that Grotius rejected.149 
It is important to see two levels of analysis in order to appreciate the argu-
ment for the common-law understanding of the rule of law.  At the first level, 
the theorist seeks to answer questions about the legitimacy of legal order, while, 
at the second, the theorist seeks to answer questions about the legitimacy of the 
exercise of legal authority.  Most contemporary legal positivists are not con-
cerned with answering questions about legitimacy, but, like Kelsen, with what 
they consider to be the purely analytic task of unpacking the conceptual struc-
ture of law.150  These arguments cannot be properly addressed here.  Instead, the 
focus will be on the arguments of normative or political positivists, who argue 
that there is a basis in political morality for the legitimacy of legal order, but 
who conclude from this basis that the best way to understand law is as positive 
law.151 
Political positivists argue that in a world with deep ideological divisions, law 
can perform the useful function of establishing a stable framework of rules for 
interaction.  But law can perform this function only if its components, its rules, 
are determinate.  Public tests must exist for determining both what counts as a 
valid primary rule—a rule governing conduct of legal subjects—and for deter-
mining the content of the rule—what it in fact requires of those subject to it.  
 
 149. Lauterpacht, supra note 109, at 340-46. 
 150. In Joseph Raz’s work, the idea of legitimacy becomes important because he thinks that legal 
authorities necessarily claim to be legitimate.  But this claim is part of the logical structure of claim to 
legal authority and so does not in his view bring one into the political or moral debate about what 
makes law in fact legitimate.  See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194 (1994). 
 151. The most prominent legal positivist of this sort is Jeremy Waldron.  Ben Kingsbury has recently 
revived this sort of positivism in the debate about the nature of international law.  Kingsbury relies on 
Waldron’s arguments but as an aid to bringing to the surface the jurisprudence of Lassa Oppenheim.  
See Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power 
and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002).  Kingsbury has fur-
ther suggested that the way forward for international law is through Grotianism.  In his summary, the 
new Grotian theory will “define and differentiate international law, separating the subject with clarity 
from other intellectual disciplines in order then to engage coherently with them.”  Benedict Kingsbury, 
The International Legal Order, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 271, 295 (Peter Cane 
& Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).  It will also “integrate an ethically justified normative positivism with 
theories going to the processes and content of international law, including a nested set of theories of 
governance, institutions, and community.  It will be a hybrid of sources-based criteria and content-
based criteria.”  Id.  For a discussion of analytic legal positivism, see David Dyzenhaus, The Genealogy 
of Legal Positivism, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2004).  Analytic legal positivism is an unproduc-
tive diversion, started by John Austin, from the political tradition of Hobbes and Bentham, so the re-
vival of normative positivism by Waldron and others is welcome.  The legal positivist view that interna-
tional law is not really law seems in the Anglo-American tradition to be due to John Austin, not to 
Jeremy Bentham.  See MW Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law,” 78 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 405 (1984).  The discussion of political legal positivism below at times relies on terminology 
developed within the tradition of analytical legal positivism, especially by H.L.A. Hart.  The claim, fol-
lowing Ronald Dworkin, about analytical legal positivism is not that analytical arguments are unhelpful 
to understanding the problems of legal order.  Rather, the claim is that they are helpful only when 
nested in political theories of law. 
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These public tests are themselves rules about rules, or secondary rules, which 
means they too must satisfy the determinacy requirement.  Ultimately, there 
will be a secondary rule so basic that no rule can be found to attest to its validity 
and this most basic rule is one that predominates in practice—a practice whose 
only guarantee of persistence is that its central participants accept that follow-
ing the rule is the right thing to do.  It is crucial that the rules, whether primary, 
secondary, or most basic secondary, all have content that can be determined as 
a matter of public fact, because otherwise law cannot perform its function of 
providing stability in a world of ideological division.  If the content of law has to 
be determined by the political arguments law is supposed to preempt, then 
ideological division will break out in debate about what the law requires, which 
undermines the point of law. 
For political positivists, certain institutional arrangements are more likely to 
help law serve its function, namely, a supreme legislature, a staff of independent 
officials or judges to interpret the law, and an administration capable of imple-
menting and enforcing the law.  However, the most important feature of legal 
order is not how it is maintained but the function it serves—the point of law.  
Thus, while international law might look like a doubtful candidate for legal or-
der because, for example, it lacks a supreme legislature, that deficiency is not 
fatal.  It is not the lack of a legislature that will disqualify international law from 
being law, but the inability of international law to perform law’s function.  Thus, 
if international lawyers today can find ways of showing either how international 
law already serves this function, or how it could if suitably reformed, there is no 
reason for a political positivist to deny international law its character as law.  
The division of powers, or separation of powers, is not something sacred.  It is 
meant to serve law’s function. 
Once legal order is established, a question arises about why those subject to 
it should comply with its rules.  One positivist answer to this question is that it 
can be preempted from arising, since in a properly functioning legal order, the 
penalties of disobedience will outweigh the rewards, so sanctions attached to 
primary rules provide sufficient reasons for obedience.  That the international 
legal order lacks the sanctioning mechanisms of domestic legal orders has often 
been thought to be a problem for international law’s claim to be law.  However, 
as in the case of the separation of powers, political positivism will not require 
sanctions as a necessary feature of legal order, unless law cannot serve its func-
tion without sanctions.  More importantly, with the exception of John Austin 
and Kelsen, no eminent legal positivist has thought sanctions to be an adequate 
answer to the question.  For political positivists, the argument from the legiti-
mating basis of legal order leading to the conclusion that positivism is the best 
way to understand law must be the reasons motivating at least a significant 
number of those subject to the law to obey it.  Thus, for example, Thomas 
Franck’s discussion of justice in The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations is 
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postponed to a “Postlude: Why not Justice?”152 because he wants to show that 
the basis of legitimacy can be made up of components that transcend ideologi-
cal division.  These are components on which the actors in the international le-
gal order can agree, whatever their different views on justice, and which thus 
explain the astonishing fact of compliance despite the lack of sanctions.153 
This still leaves the question that occurs at a second level.154  Once one has 
established the legitimating basis of legal order and worked out the structure of 
legal order shaped by one’s conception of law’s function, the question remains 
about how legal power is to be exercised in all three modes of power:  legisla-
tive, executive, and interpretative.  For positivists, law is the vehicle for express-
ing determinate judgments capable of stabilizing what would otherwise be an 
endless power play of contestable interpretations.  Law itself therefore places 
no constraints on legislative power.  Those who have legislative power are sim-
ply enjoined to come up with their best judgment, all things considered, about 
what the law should be.  However, when it comes to implementation and inter-
pretation of the law, those charged with these tasks must first seek to determine 
the actual content of the law.  Only if they find no actual or determinate content 
are they free to act on their own interpretation, which they should make in the 
way just sketched.  When the executive and the judiciary have this freedom, 
their judgment is thus quasi-legislative. 
The common-law conception of law differs from that of the positivist in 
making claims primarily, even exclusively, at the second level.  While the com-
mon law tradition does appeal to time immemorial as a kind of external legiti-
mation of the common law method, the focus of its legitimacy claim is on the 
method—on the idea of working the law pure.  If legal power is exercised in ac-
cordance with the values of the common law, it will be legitimate, which is tan-
tamount to saying that it will have legal authority or the character of legality.  It 
is also tantamount to saying that the law is just, at least from the perspective of 
legality. 
Moreover, although the rule-of-law values for the positivist tradition—
certainty, stability, and so on—are also part of the common law’s set of values, 
they are not the only, or even the most important, part.  Generality of law, 
equality before the law, fairness (including the requirements of natural justice 
and the requirement that all decisions be given or be capable of being given a 
reasonable justification), and the liberty and dignity of the legal subject are all 
very strong candidates for the common law’s stock of legal values.  Some or all 
 
 152. FRANCK, supra note 113, at 208. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Persuasion and Enforcement: Explaining Compli-
ance with International Law, 13 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 273 (2002).  Taking their inspiration, from the 
legal theory of Lon L. Fuller, Brunnée and Toope argue Franck is right in that internal features of law 
must play a role in an account of the legitimacy of law, but this role cannot be adequately captured by a 
positivist theory of law.  Law’s ability to assert authority over power lies in an account of law’s workings 
that includes the procedural and substantive components necessary to understand law’s nature as an 
interactional rather than managerial (positivistic) enterprise. 
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of these values will figure in many attempts to find a first level justification for 
law.  But the claim of the common law is that they are needed to make sense of 
law from the inside, as an account of a properly functioning legal order.  The 
values do not then have to be incorporated from outside the law, as positivists 
would have it.  Rather, the values are necessarily implicated in the process of 
working the law pure. 
At this second level the contest between political positivism and the com-
mon-law conception of legality is properly joined.  For the common law does 
not allow the issue of justice to be deferred to a kind of postscript to under-
standing the legitimacy of law.  Justice is internal to the ways in which legal au-
thority manifests itself, if such manifestation is to be either legal or authorita-
tive.  As is the case with political positivism, issues about other features of legal 
order, such as the structure of the separation or division of powers, are not es-
sential.  What matters most is service to the function of law, which for the com-
mon-law conception is both to provide a stable framework of rules and to en-
sure that when someone is made subject to an exercise of legal power, the 
exercise is just.  Put another way, the exercise must not be arbitrary—it must be 
in accordance with the law.  However, that point can and is, of course, also 
made by political legal positivism.  The difference resides in the substantive 
content of justice, which the common law equates with non-arbitrariness. 
The point of the epigraph by Lauterpacht is not only that natural law is 
secularized.  Rather, it is no longer seen as a source of law, but as a way of mak-
ing sense from inside the legal order.  As Lauterpacht writes, it is important not 
to underestimate Kelsen’s contribution both to general jurisprudence and to 
our understanding of international law.  The idea that all state power, even at 
the international level, is subject to the rule of law is a moral milestone, an ex-
pression of the liberal hope that, as Carl Schmitt understood it,  the exception 
could be banished from the world.155 
In common-law legal orders, the gradual subjection of prerogative powers to 
the control of both legislation and the common law can rightly be thought of as 
an expression of that hope in legal practice.  Similarly, the thought that interna-
tional law is just as much law as domestic law and that the task for the jurist is to 
seek to harmonize the norms of both by regarding each as a part of a unity, is an 
important step in the movement from the misery of the state of nature.  Kelsen 
goes wrong, however, in refusing to countenance the thought of enlightenment 
as a reciprocal process.  International law can be viewed as the default system 
with whose norms domestic law must always comply only if one is compelled, as 
Kelsen thought, to avoid any reference to the laws of nature, to the substantive 
moral content of the rule of law. 
Here, Hobbes is a surer guide than Kelsen, for he saw that the exercise of 
legal authority is conditioned by an understanding of the laws of nature.  It is 
 
 155. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 48 (George Schwab trans., M.I.T. Press 1985) (1922). 
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significant that if one looks to Hobbes himself (rather than to the Hobbesian, or 
Hobbist, tradition of political and legal thought), he had very much the same 
view.  Hobbes, despite his deep opposition to the common-law tradition, shares 
with it the thought that intrinsic to the very idea of legality is a set of values, ar-
ticulated in his discussion of the laws of nature, with which law must comply if it 
is to have any authority.156 
In order for the sovereign to exercise judgment about what the laws of na-
ture require, he must generally exercise that judgment through law.157  Hobbes’s 
claim that the sovereign cannot do injustice is a shorthand way of saying that 
the sovereign’s laws cannot be unjust.  However, before laws can achieve the 
status of immunity to charges of injustice, they first must achieve the status of 
law, which requires they be in compliance not only with secondary rules, but 
also with the laws of nature.  Hobbes is clear that all laws require interpretation, 
and that interpretation is a task that falls to an independent staff of officials—
judges—who must regard the law alone when deciding what is required by 
law.158 
Hobbes also says it would be an insult to the sovereign for judges to impute 
inequity to the sovereign, requiring them to interpret the law in a way that is 
consistent with equity.  Further, he assumes judges have to be able interpreters 
of the laws of nature, which suggests that they are to interpret the civil law in 
light of their understanding of the laws of nature.  Laws thus have to be justifi-
able—potentially or in fact—as particularizations of the laws of nature since all 
laws are potentially subject to judicial interpretation.  Indeed, it is Hobbes’s 
view that judges are best understood not as competitors for sovereign authority, 
 
 156. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Cambridge University Press 1997) (1651), especially ch. 
26, “Of Civil Laws,” ch. 14, “Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts,” and ch. 15, “Of 
Other Laws of Nature.”  For discussion, see David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 
L. & PHIL. 461 (2001).  Similarly, I think it significant that in his later reflection on the topic of legiti-
macy, FRANCK, supra note 114, at 47, includes a chapter on “Equity as Fairness.”  Regarding the first 
level of legitimacy, Hobbes does argue that anyone who is not a prisoner or slave within civil society 
should understand he has consented to the authority of the sovereign.  But since Hobbes considers all 
actual sovereign power to be originally won by violence, he does not think an inquiry into the founda-
tion of any actual state to be fruitful for understanding why the sovereign is legitimate.  Rather, he is 
more concerned, again to borrow from Lauterpacht on Grotius, to show how the uncertainty of the 
higher or natural law, as concretized by the sovereign, is “preferable to the arbitrariness and insolence 
of naked force.”  Lauterpacht, supra note 109.  If all there was to natural law was the sovereign’s inter-
pretations, that would make natural law disappear at the moment of sovereign judgment, as Norberto 
Bobbio understood Hobbes as requiring.  NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL 
LAW TRADITION (Daniela Gobetti trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1993) (1989).  This understanding 
neglects Hobbes’s account of the role of judges. 
 157. Hobbes does not limit the exercise of the sovereign’s power to making laws that will then au-
thorize his officials to implement the law.  The sovereign may and sometimes must also act in excep-
tional situations, including foreign affairs.  However, when the sovereign so acts he is still bound to act 
on an understanding of what the laws of nature require, just as officials and judges must, in the absence 
of the sovereign’s explicit judgment, decide in the light of their understanding of the same laws.  If one 
puts Hobbes and Kelsen together in one package, one gets a potent combination of the Kelsenian idea 
that all sovereign acts are subject to law with Hobbes’s argument that the laws of nature are necessarily 
part of the law to which the sovereign is subject. 
 158. See HOBBES, supra note 156, at ch. 26. 
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but as the sovereign’s agents, because they complete the legislative process in 
their interpretations.159  In common with the common-law position, Hobbes 
holds the view that all legal powers within civil society must be understood to 
be engaged in a project of realizing the values of the laws of nature, many of 
which reflect both the principles Lauterpacht outlined as general principles of 
law and those developed in the common law of judicial review. 
It follows logically from such a position that a technically valid law that 
strays from the normative basis of law’s authority is under a cloud of legal 
doubt:  its claim to authority is shaky from the perspective of the rule of law.  
Whether or not there exists an institution to which one subject to the law can 
appeal to have it invalidated is of course an issue of great importance.  But the 
point about the law’s dubious claim to authority does not depend on that issue.  
For once the point is understood, the case has been made for creating such an 
institution where none existed, or for a state to submit the issue to an existing 
institution; for without this step, the commitment by states to the rule of law 
appears hypocritical. 
In the same way, the Security Council’s delegation of power to the 1267 
Committee, and the subsequent exercise of authority by the Committee, lacked 
legal authority, whether or not one accepts that the Security Council is entitled 
to legislate.  For a domestic court to give legal force to the lists established by 
the 1267 Committee, or to let doctrines of immunity stand in the way of those 
who have been harmed by such a list and who seek a remedy, is to allow the Se-
curity Council to establish a kind of legal black hole both internationally and 
domestically.  Of course, it is embarrassing for a domestic court to face a di-
lemma between deciding in favor of immunity and providing access to a court 
without which an individual will find himself in a legal void, or between enforc-
ing what looks like an international obligation, particularized by a domestic 
statute, to give force to a list of suspected terrorists and respecting the require-
ments of the common-law constitution.  Kelsen, it seems, would recommend 
that whenever a court faces a choice between domestic law and international 
law, it should choose the latter, if it is not to be a barbarian. 
But the dilemmas are often not easily described as clashes between two legal 
orders. Rather, they seem to be tensions that arise out of values that are recog-
nised both domestically and internationally. The tensions in the situation cre-
ated by the 1267 Committee are not only between norms of the rule of law and 
a norm issued by an international body. They are also tensions within the inter-
national legal order between that norm and conventions that guarantee access 
to a court, and within the Canadian domestic order between the Charter and 
the common law, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Terrorism Regulations 
made by the Cabinet under the authority of the United Nations Act.  And even 
if the clash is between an international and a domestic norm, one needs Kel-
 
 159. Nevertheless, he seeks to ensure that their judgments do not compete with the general laws by 
refusing them application beyond the particular case. 
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sen’s refusal to move beyond moral relativism to require that the choice be 
automatically for the international norm.  Finally, judges should be loath to 
characterize the issue as a clash between two norms until that characterization is 
forced on them by a very explicit statement in a technically valid legal instru-
ment.  Far better is to adopt the view taken by the common-law judges de-
scribed earlier, which appears to be more or less the natural law view of the rule 
of law advocated by Lauterpacht.  As he put it, the question for international 
law is whether it should refuse to admit “its present imperfections and by ele-
vating them to the authority of legitimate and permanent manifestations of a 
‘specific’ law, abdicate its task of raising itself above the level of a specific com-
munity?”160  Thus, he argued, one should regard international law as a law of 
“subordination,” a subjection to the rule of law, so that its future development 
is conditioned by a progressive approximation to “those standards of morals 
and order which are the ultimate foundation of all law.”161  The choice for law, 
then, is to make every effort to realize the substantive values of the rule of law 
in both the domestic and international legal orders. 
The argument is not that judges working within their domestic legal orders 
can undertake this task.  Rather, they can alert us to rule of law problems that 
are the result of decisions made by the principal actors in international law.  If 
those problems seem to be part of a pattern, and thus systemic, they can be cor-
rected only by institutional reform at the international level.  Systemic problems 
about the exercise of legal authority—problems that arise at the second level—
can be corrected only at the first level, in the design of legitimate legal order.  In 
making this point, one perhaps lays the foundation for a productive rapproche-
ment between political positivism and the natural law tradition, the latter being 
exemplified in the idea of the common-law constitution. 
All one needs for such a rapprochement to take place is a concession from 
both camps.  The natural law camp would concede that solutions to systemic 
problems are ultimately political, not legal, in nature, and that, often, judges 
neither have the authority to provide them nor, usually, are they best placed to 
design them.  The positivist camp would concede that legal authority is condi-
tioned by values that go beyond certainty and stability. With these concessions 
in place, one has removed at least the theoretical obstacles in the way of a pro-
ject of realizing a global rule of (administrative) law. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
In part I, I explored how judges of a natural law bent have in common law 
legal orders developed a productive understanding of the rule of law to which 
public officials can be held to account.  As I showed, that understanding has 
been greatly enriched by the judges’ sense of the importance of international 
 
 160. See Lauterpacht, supra note 117, at 19. 
 161. Id. 
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human rights norms.  Yet, as we also saw in Part I, international bodies are as 
capable as their domestic counterparts of issuing norms that are in tension with 
the rule of law.  I did not argue that judges are always able to resolve such ten-
sions, nor that they are best equipped to craft solutions.  Rather, I argued that 
the crucial point is that a commitment to the rule of law requires that solutions 
be developed and that one has to adopt a richer understanding of the rule of 
law than that espoused by legal positivism.  Moreover, as I argued in Part II, 
this richer understanding of the rule of law supports the idea of international 
law and of international legal order, though it requires that international legal 
order become more mature institutionally. In the context of my case study of 
the 1267 Committee, that requirement translates into the development of ap-
propriate due process requirements before any individual is listed as a sus-
pected terrorist.  As we saw, the problem from the perspective of the rule of law 
with such listing mechanisms is by no means confined to the international legal 
order.  But then the virtue of the conception of the rule of law sketched in these 
pages is that it applies equally to domestic and international legal order. 
